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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The war in Afghanistan approaches its first decade. During the last two years, the 
security situation has worsened, also in the northern parts of the country where the 
Norwegian military contribution in Afghanistan has its centre of gravity. Norway has 
leadership responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab 
province, north-east Afghanistan. The PRT carries responsibility for security, 
development and improved governance in the province, and is largely focused on 
cooperation with the Afghan forces and authorities to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
Afghan government (Ministry of Defence 2010). In addition, a substantial part of the 
Norwegian force contribution in Faryab consists of teams for training and operations 
with the Afghan Army (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team – OMLT) and the 
Afghan police. 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which includes the Norwegian 
forces in Faryab, is scaling up the effort to boost the capacity of the Afghan forces. 
Since 2009, military advising and operations with the Afghan forces have received an 
increased focus. The current policy seems to point towards transfer of authority – to 
build Afghan capacity and transfer full responsibility of the security to the afghan 
authorities (NATO 2010).  When newly commissioned as the new commander of 
ISAF, general David Petraeus stated, “we will all continue the current strategy (…) to 
gradually transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghans” (2010).  
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The Norwegian policy also states the importance of transferring authority to the 
Afghan Governments. In Norwegian policy documents, a vital part of the 
Government’s approach is to  
… build Afghan capacity and ownership, in order to gradually transfer more 
responsibility to the Afghan Governments, so-called ’Afghanization’. 
(Ministry of Defence 2009:2) 
Norway’s Minister of Defence stated that “the Norwegian contribution will shift to a 
greater focus on supporting the Afghan Security Forces” (Faremo 2010b), and “we 
must build – not substitute – Afghan capacity” (Faremo 2010a).  
The Norwegian forces in Afghanistan are responsible for a vital part of the 
implementation of this policy.1 The mission given to the Norwegian forces is to 
conduct operations together with the Afghan forces in order to 
…maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate good governance and 
development, thus extending GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan] authority and influence within FARYAB province. (ISAF 
20102) 
At a more practical level, this implies that Norwegian officers are not only meant to 
train Afghan forces, but work together with Afghan officers and Afghan police, 
participate in Afghan-led operations, and support government authorities. Norwegian 
soldiers and officers, who are tasked with implementing the policy on the ground, 
therefore work closely with people of a very different background, education and 
culture than themselves. 
There are some universal ethical challenges and dilemmas connected to the transfer of 
responsibility to local authorities in a war-torn society such as Afghanistan’s. State-
building in war-torn societies is extremely complex. As the Norwegian Minister of 
                                              
1
 Other efforts are also aimed at strengthening the Afghan security sector. For instance, Norway is planning to support the 
financing of the Afghan Army (ANA Trust Fund) with 40 million US dollars from 2011 to 2013 (Ministry of Defence 
2010). 
2
 Norwegian Contingent Report; available from the author. 
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Foreign Affairs stated, ”Afghanization implies choosing [Afghan] solutions that do 
not necessarily comply with the solutions we would prefer” (Støre 2009). These 
problems are most directly felt at the implementation level, where soldiers and 
officers need to work alongside indigenous forces. Living and operating closely with 
a foreign force and in the context of a foreign culture is likely to cause challenges. 
And choosing Afghan solutions that do not comply with what oneself might prefer 
can be problematic for those who are supposed to implement the policy, and who 
experience such contradictions on a daily basis. 
1.2 Research Question 
The intent of this thesis is to investigate the challenges facing Norwegian officers in 
Afghanistan when transferring responsibility for security to Afghan forces and 
authorities. The research question therefore goes: 
What challenges do Norwegian officers meet in Afghanistan in their efforts to build 
Afghan capacity and transfer authority and responsibility of security to the Afghan 
National Security Forces? 
Two factors make this a particularly interesting matter to investigate. First, it is an 
important part of Norwegian foreign policy, and how the policy is implemented. The 
outcome of the war in Afghanistan will be of importance for Norway, NATO and the 
western world – in addition to Afghanistan itself. Therefore, it is necessary to gain 
more knowledge about this operation, and by doing so shed light on the roles the 
Norwegian Armed Forces could have in the implementation of foreign policy. 
Second, training and cooperating with indigenous forces is a rarely investigated topic 
in international research on so-called state-building operations. Previous research has 
primarily focused on which role military forces can fill on their own in such 
operations, not in cooperation with local forces. Thus, the analysis seeks to bridge a 
knowledge gap in the literature on building states in war-torn societies. 
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1.3 Discussion of terminology 
1.3.1 The military advisors 
Military units performing advisory tasks have a wide array of names, including 
advisory team, military training team, embedded training team, assistance team, 
mentor team etc.; which of them is chosen often reflects the unit’s main effort, such 
as whether they are embedded and closely follow the local forces on operations, for 
instance. The term advisor may bring associations to a less active role in combat and 
offensive operations. However, for field advisors – who are the focus of this analysis 
– these activities have been regarded as a complex military task. As one officer 
pointed out, “it is not coincidental that SOF [Special Operation Forces] traditionally 
have been earmarked to train indigenous security forces” (Haug 2009:111). The term 
military advising does not cover the wide array of tasks performed by the personnel, 
but it does emphasize the main objective of these activities: enabling others to master 
the challenges. 
Military assistance is occasionally used in literature to grasp a wider spectrum of 
support in the form of equipment, money, armaments and other types of support 
(Nygard 2009:10). Advising is in this regard more specific than assistance, since it 
entails interaction between two human beings: the advisor and the advised. As the 
different Norwegian military units in Afghanistan also have many names, I shall 
therefore use the term military advisor throughout this analysis, in order to address all 
those officers who cooperate closely with one or several Afghan authorities or forces.   
1.3.2 The counterpart 
The term “indigenous forces” is often used in historical literature, and applied “to all 
those local people who offer the potential to serve as trained auxiliaries to the 
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government forces, as government forces, or with the occupation forces” (Cassidy 
2006:62).3 
Training of indigenous forces can sometimes entail unconventional operations such as 
the training of militias or irregular forces in foreign countries, for instance coup d’état 
in (potentially) hostile regimes during the Cold War. In conflicts where the 
indigenous forces are, or are supposed to become, a state institution rather than a 
guerrilla movement, the host nation forces are normally addressed by their names or 
abbreviations, such as the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), El Salvador Armed 
Forces (ESAF), the Iraqi National Guard (ING) and the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF). In this analysis, with some exceptions in connection with reviews of 
the historical literature, the different Afghan forces will be called by their specific 
names. The terms “Afghan forces” and ANSF will be used to indicate the Afghan 
security forces as a whole, for instance both the Afghan National Police and the 
Afghan National Army. 
Since the personal relationship between the advisor and the advisees is a vital part of 
this analysis, the term “counterpart” (abbreviated CP) will be used for the actual 
recipient of the advice and support. It is also commonly used in a variety of literary 
sources, documents and doctrines, including this analysis.  
1.4 Further structure of the thesis 
The next chapter, chapter two, will give an account for the research methods and 
discuss methodological issues of this analysis. The research was designed as an 
exploratory case study with a qualitative approach, based on semi-structured 
interviews of practitioners of military advising. Chapter two will also give an account 
                                              
3Indigenous in this sense refers to a demographic or local connection, which is naturally not desirable in discussions of 
national, centrally controlled forces. “Host nation forces” is a more neutral term, and used consistently in the recent 
American military doctrines (US Army 2006:2-4, US Army 2008:6-82). 
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of the data gathering process, criteria for the selection of respondents, credibility and 
reliability of the research, and some ethical considerations. 
Chapter three presents a review of literature on state-building operations in general 
and military advising in particular. The point here is to look at potential challenges for 
military advisors involved in state-building operations, to form an analytical 
framework for further analysis, and to derive questions to put to the respondents. The 
analytical framework also structures the discussion throughout the thesis, which is 
roughly divided into ethical, technical and cultural challenges.  
Chapter four presents and analyses the findings based on the empirical material. They 
will be exemplified by quotations from the respondents. The chapter will discuss the 
challenges experienced by the Norwegian officers thematically in accordance with the 
analytical framework set out in chapter three. In addition to the thematically 
structured presentation, some findings at the outer fringes of the material are 
presented in order to show the variance in the data.  
Finally, chapter five will summarize the most pressing challenges facing Norwegian 
officers in working together with Afghan forces and authorities, how they relate to the 
reviewed literature. The chapter also discusses those challenges which, interestingly, 
are considered manageable. The chapter will seek to look beyond operations in 
Afghanistan, in order to see differences in how officers experience interaction with 
indigenous people in other conflicts. It will be argued that there are fundamental 
differences between the operation in Afghanistan and Kosovo regarding perceptions 
of those one is there to help. 
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2. Methodology 
This chapter gives an account of the research methods chosen and discusses 
methodological issues of this analysis, including the research design, how the 
interviews were conducted and some credibility and reliability issues. In addition, 
some of the motivation for this research project comes from personal experience of 
military advising. It is therefore important to give an account of the ethical 
considerations that were made in this regard, given that the author has links to the 
topic and organization investigated.  
2.1 Research design 
The analysis was designed as an explorative case-study of Norwegian officers’ 
experienced challenges when cooperating closely with indigenous security forces and 
government officials in Afghanistan. The research design is closely linked to the 
research question, which is posed as an open, empirical question. 
Little research has been done on cooperation between Afghan and western forces and 
the following transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan authorities. As it is a 
rather new topic, it calls for an exploratory approach and empirical research question 
in order to gain more knowledge. The purpose is to explore and describe the 
challenges officers face in this partnership. The analysis does not therefore seek to 
generalize, but to enhance our insight into and knowledge of the challenges this 
interaction causes. In a bigger perspective, further research could build on this 
knowledge to explore causal chains and explain why states, military units or Afghan 
and Norwegian officers act as the do. However, since the bulkheads between an 
explanatory and exploratory approach are rarely waterproof, elements of explanations 
will be discussed in the analysis.  
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2.2 Description of the data-gathering process 
The analysis builds on ten qualitative interviews of practitioners of military advising, 
more specifically Norwegian officers working with Afghan Security forces and 
authorities. The study asks how practitioners experience and perceive certain 
challenges at a personal level, something the in-depth interview as a method is likely 
to reveal. Since the research has an exploratory approach, relevant literature is 
reviewed in the initial part of the analysis. The literature review is used to create an 
analytical framework to structure the data gathering and the analysis of the empirical 
material. This is done by identifying potential challenges described in literature, 
categorizing those challenges and deducing questions to put to the respondents (see 
interview guide, appendix 1). The respondents’ answers to these questions constitute 
the empirical data on which the findings are based.  
2.2.1 Criteria for selection of respondents 
Several considerations affected the selection of respondents. First and foremost, the 
respondents needed to have had close working and personal relations with those they 
advised, in order to reveal challenges of proximity of living and operating close to 
indigenous people in a foreign culture. Second, the analysis focuses on field advisors: 
combat units immersed in the local situation with face-to-face contact with 
government officials. Officers with field experience4 of working alongside Afghan 
forces were therefore chosen. Third, leadership experience at a certain level was 
considered necessary since decision makers are most prone to face the tough choices 
thrown up in post-war state-building operations. 
Fourth, to give a broader picture of cooperation with the Afghan Government, i.e. the 
Afghan police, politicians and government officials, members of the PRT were also 
selected as respondents. They work closely with actors such as the Afghan police and 
                                              
4
 Field experience in this regard refers to experience with the planning and implementation of military operations, and their 
conduct on the ground. 
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civilian provincial and district leaders, while the OMLT personnel mainly operate 
with the Afghan Army. Fifth, Norwegian cooperation with Afghan forces has been in 
progress for many years, but received increased attention since 2009. Recent 
experience of working in Afghanistan over the last two years was therefore seen a 
necessary criterion. 
All in all, the majority of respondents were officers from the teams training the 
Afghan Army; they met most of the criteria and constituted the largest group of 
respondents. In addition, some respondents from the Norwegian PRT units, who 
cooperate with other Afghan actors, were included.5  
2.2.2 Pilot interviews 
Two pilot interviews were conducted to test the ability of the questions to reflect the 
experienced challenges. While the two respondents in these pilot interviews met the 
selection criteria discussed above, their answers have been left out of the data material 
for two reasons. First, their answers indicated a need to adjust the interview guide. 
Afterwards, more questions were added and some taken away. Second, the two 
respondents also discussed the topic and the questions at a meta-level; for instance 
they were involved brain-storming sessions or other exercises that made it difficult to 
include those interviews.  
2.2.3 The interview process 
Although the respondents were geographically scattered, their flexibility (and 
transfer-flights) meant that the field work became cost-effective, methodologically 
acceptable and conducted in accordance with the selection criteria. The interviews 
took place mainly at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies or at the 
                                              
5
 The majority of the respondents were at the level of company commander or equivalent position, with the rank of captain 
and approximately ten to eighteen years of military experience. The rest of the group had been commanding officers at the 
battalion level or equivalent position, with the rank of lieutenant colonel and approximately ten more years of military 
experience.   
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respondents’ offices. Two interviews were conducted in public places, though in a 
private atmosphere, and this may have affected the confidentiality. One interview was 
conducted by e-mail and phone; the result was acceptable because the respondent was 
very thorough in his written answers and follow-up questions asked over the phone. 
All interviews were digitally recorded after the respondents have given their consent 
in writing, and written up within a day to avoid forgetting any particular nuances or 
impressions. The data have been treated confidentially in accordance with guidelines 
from Norwegian Social Science Services (NDS), where the project also is registered. 
Ethical considerations are discussed below. 
2.3 Discussion of validity and reliability of the study 
Though not all agree that validity and reliability are relevant criteria for evaluating 
qualitative research (Bryman 2008:376), certain aspects of validity and credibility 
regarding this analysis should be discussed. Most important are those relating to 
validity of the relevance of the study (transferability), and transparency and 
objectivity when collecting and interpreting the data.  
2.3.1 Validity  
The analysis is designed as an explorative case-study by qualitative interviews of 
practitioners. The external validity of such a method is somewhat reduced since the 
ability to generalize to a wider population is limited. But the intention with this 
research is to explore and explain rather than generalize. Also, the empirical material 
is based on the first-hand experiences of the respondents. The findings may therefore 
have value for other forces in similar contexts, and be relevant to subjects and settings 
beyond those involved in the study (Hovi 2009). For instance, most officers in 
Afghanistan interact with local forces or authorities, and most practitioners of military 
advising are likely to face similar challenges in other operations. Both NATO and the 
European Union contribute in operations supporting local police and security forces at 
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the Balkans or in Africa. The research is likely to have transferable value to the other 
officers in similar contexts, which enhances external validity (Bryman 2008:377).  
Internal validity is often argued to be the strength of qualitative research itself, and 
credibility is therefore an alternative criteria for evaluating internal validity6 (Bryman 
2008:377). In this thesis, credibility is sought by ensuring that the research was 
conducted in compliance with good practice, for instance by cooperating with and 
responding to feedback from the Norwegian Social Science Service (NSD). Further, 
the findings were submitted to other researchers at the Institute of Defence Studies to 
confirm whether the researcher understood the social world that has been 
investigated. In addition, all respondents were asked to give feedback on the interview 
process and the questions posed.7  Finally, personal experience as a practitioner of 
military advising may increase the validity of the findings in the collecting and 
interpreting of the data. 
2.3.2 Reliability 
In some cases, the ethical guidelines on collecting data may conflict with the 
transparency and external reliability of the study, or the study’s replicability. Since the 
data may contain sensitive information, the respondents are made anonymous. The 
link between the respondents and their answers will be destroyed at the end of the 
research project in accordance with NSD guidelines. The Norwegian Armed Forces is 
a small organization and the respondents’ anonymity may be compromised if the 
dataset containing transcribed interviews is made publicly available. However, the 
study is, to some extent, still replicable through the criteria for selection, and the fact 
that there are many respondents available. However, in this case some transparency 
must be traded for preserving confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents.  
                                              
6For alternative criteria for evaluating qualitative research, see Lincoln and Guba (1985). 
7This does not fully account for a respondent validation, but it was not considered useful since it is  questionable whether 
the respondents can validate the researcher’s analysis (Bryman 2008:378). 
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2.3.3 Objectivity   
The final criterion for discussion is objectivity. It cannot be excluded that the 
interviewer being an officer has affected the respondents during the interviews, and 
the analysis as a whole. For instance, combat situations or how the respondents 
characterize the Afghan forces might be interpreted differently by researchers other 
than a practitioner. However, complete objectivity in social research is rarely possible. 
The researcher should act in good faith and not deliberately let personal values or 
theoretical inclinations sway the research (Bryman 2008:379). Transparency 
regarding methods, field work and own background is therefore important. A more 
thorough discussion regarding the ethical aspects of this will be discussed below. 
Personal experience may also give comparative advantages: familiarity with the 
military system, military jargon, the Afghan forces and the cases described might 
increase the level of confidentiality and trust in the interviews.  
2.4 Ethical considerations 
Some important ethical considerations should be discussed regarding this research 
project. These are mainly to do with the author’s role beyond being a researcher, and 
anonymity and security considerations for the respondents.  
The project has been at pains to uphold the ethical research guidelines issued by the 
Norwegian Social Science Service (NSD). Having chosen the qualitative interview as 
a method, it naturally follows that the researcher gets close to the respondents. That 
might be a challenge when asking about personal relations to the Afghan counterparts 
and potential dilemmas the respondents experienced. Other research has shown that 
negative attitudes towards indigenous people can be a sensitive topic (Røkenes 
2005:29, Mæland 2004:22). There may be issues respondents do not wish to discuss 
in this regard. It has therefore been important to avoid constructing a picture of the 
respondents’ attitudes, but rather to clarify their answers and let quotations from the 
interviews exemplify their arguments.  
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My service in the Norwegian Armed Forces may have affected the research, both by 
strengthening it and by exposing it to bias. However, I neither knew personally nor 
have been formally in the line of command of the respondents, though I was familiar 
with who they were, their military education and their position. I also had some idea 
about what characterized their tour in Afghanistan, but this information was mainly 
gleaned from the contingency reports. The respondents were informed about my 
background when they were asked to be interviewed. Indeed, my background helped 
simplify the conversations on military technicalities like operations, locations in 
Afghanistan, the situation on the ground and especially the characteristics of the 
Afghan forces. This common ground is a source of potential bias, but it is also likely 
that it increased the respondents’ sense of confidentiality and strengthened the 
credibility of the research.  
Written approval, both of the NSD and the Norwegian Armed Forces, was obtained 
before contacting the respondents and collecting the data (see appendix 2 and 3). All 
respondents were contacted by the author, given written information of the research 
project and their rights as respondents, and signed a written consent form before the 
interviews (see appendix 4). As the project might touch on sensitive, personal 
information all respondents were made anonymous to protect their privacy. It should 
be mentioned that none expressed a wish for anonymity; a few even questioned the 
necessity.  
2.4.1 Security and classified material 
Security regulations on handling classified material have not posed serious problems 
in this research, though some of information that came up during the interviews may 
be considered classified. That information is naturally left out, since the author, by 
law, carries a personal responsibility for complying with security regulations in the 
handling of classified material (for instance, certain geographical names, operation 
names and names of Afghan counterparts are deliberately left out). The analysis 
focuses on normative perceptions of officers, not of their or their unit’s conduct of 
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operations, and there were only a few cases where these considerations had to be 
made. Some reports classified ‘restricted’ have been used as background information, 
but not as primary sources. The respondents were informed that the project would 
result in a publicly available, unclassified thesis, and asked to inform the author if any 
material needed to be regarded as classified for reasons of security. However, the 
author bears full responsibility for any breaches of security regulations.   
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3. From literature review to analytical framework 
In this chapter I review previous research on state-building operations in general and 
military training of and advice to indigenous forces in particular. The intent of the 
chapter is to develop an analytical framework, in addition to questions to the 
respondents, for the empirical study of challenges facing Norwegian officers serving 
as advisors to the ANSF. Since relatively few academic scholars have focused on the 
topic of training indigenous forces, a review is made of the different approaches and 
genres in the literature. In some instances I will also draw on my own experience as a 
military advisor in Afghanistan in 2009. 
The examined literature can be roughly categorized into two main groups. First, the 
scholarly literature on state-building in war-torn societies is reviewed in order to 
search for relevant dilemmas that arise when using external forces to build state 
institutions. This is a complex topic, dealing with questions at a high level of 
abstraction. Against the background of this literature review, four potential ethical 
dilemmas military advisors may face in Afghanistan are presented. Second, section 
two will investigate the literature on military advising. Naturally, literature of a 
military origin tends to focus on lessons learned and further implications for training, 
selection and future operations rather than in-depth analyses of challenges. For 
instance, the most extensive research project examined, the 1965 RAND Vietnam 
study8, was initiated to “suggest ways in which the relationship could be improved so 
that Vietnamese military authorities would be more likely than they are at present to 
understand, accept and act on American advice” (Hickey 1965:1). The literature on 
military advising consists largely of concrete “advice for advisors”. However, this 
advice is deduced from a very wide array of research publications, military reports, 
biographies, doctrines and interviews.  
                                              
8
 Dr Hickey built this study on ten years work on Vietnam, including four years in the country. He spoke fluent Vietnamese 
and interviewed 320 American advisors and soldiers serving in advisory units (Ramsey 2006a:58). 
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Three categories of challenges are derived from the literature on military advising. 
First, challenges connected to the outside force’s expertise, second, practical 
problems related to the area of operations; and third, a set of cultural challenges, 
which will be identified in a separate section below.  
3.1 Ethical dilemmas in state-building operations 
3.1.1 Introduction to the literature 
In recent years, an extensive literature on state-building in war-torn societies has 
emerged. This includes literature on peace operations (Berdal 2009, Bellamy et al. 
2004), state-making in fractured and failed states (Ayoob 1996, Chabal and Daloz 
1999, Paris and Sisk 2009b), components of state-building such as electoral systems 
and power-sharing arrangements (Rothchild and Roeder 2005, Blanc et al. 2006),  and 
state-building challenges in Afghanistan (IISS 2009, Suhrke 2009, Stephenson et al. 
2010). A common denominator of these operations (and the literature) is the likely 
blurring of the distinction between “war” and “peace”, “conflict” and “post-
conflict”(Berdal 2009:24).  
In The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations, Paris and Sisk (2009a) summarize many of the contradictions and 
dilemmas of post-war state-building. According to them, there are some “unchanging 
and unchangeable” universal contradictions embedded in the very idea of externally 
assisted statebuilding (2009a:305). These contradictions are at a “rather high level of 
abstraction from the day-to-day realities of statebuilding operations” (Paris and Sisk 
2009a:306), but manifest themselves as concrete policy dilemmas which practitioners 
of state-building routinely have to struggle with. Dilemmas, which Berdal describes 
as “trade-offs”, can be caused by tensions between requirements of physical security 
in the short term and policy objectives for stability in the longer term (Berdal 
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2009:21). According to Berdal, “trade-offs, priority-setting and awkward 
compromises between these sets of objectives simply cannot be avoided” (2009:22).  
In state-building operations, long-term capacity-building of weak security sectors is 
often a critical objective for achieving stability in the longer term (Berdal 
2009:20,120). Outside support for strengthening the security sector is considered by 
scholars and policymakers alike to be important in efforts to stabilize societies that are 
ridden and fractured by conflict. It is therefore likely that Norwegian officers, as 
practitioners of one component of state-building, will face some of these dilemmas in 
their efforts to support Afghan police and military forces.  
Before describing the dilemmas derived from literature, certain provisos should be 
made. First, the word ‘dilemma’ should be used advisedly. Paris and Sisk define 
dilemmas as “problems that defy easy solutions because they present choices between 
multiple, conflicting imperatives” (2009a:306). Further, I use the word “challenge” as 
a subordinate term relative to “dilemma”. A challenge in this regard is a problem with 
less conflicting solutions. It is still a demanding problem, but less so than a dilemma.   
Second, it is worth noting that Paris and Sisk describe dilemmas as problems for 
policy – rather than for practitioners (2009a:306). For instance, some difficult choices 
and contradictions are handled by politicians at a higher level – not by officers in the 
field. But as I discussed in the introduction, policy dilemmas have a tendency to 
trickle down to the practitioner level, and “loose ends” or contradictions in the policy 
have a tendency to “flap the hardest at the end of the line where the policy has to be 
implemented on the ground” (Thompson 1966:158). Practitioners, like military 
advisors, are the ones who have to “live the contradictions on the ground, on the daily 
basis, and have to live with them afterward” (Simons 2003:129). 
Third, several dilemmas are described in Paris’s book and in the wider literature on 
state-building in war-torn societies.9 I address only those dilemmas that are most 
                                              
9
 The other dilemmas are the ‘coherency dilemmas’, ‘footprint dilemmas’ and ‘participation dilemmas’ (Paris and Sisk 
2009:306). The participation dilemmas, or challenges facing actors participating in post-war political processes, are 
probably familiar to Norwegian officers. But these Afghan actors are normally predetermined; they are therefore less likely 
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relevant for the analysis, i.e. those which Norwegian officers are most likely to have 
experienced.  
The fourth and final thing to note is that the dilemmas are derived from the very 
complex dynamics that are at play in war-torn societies, and they might overlap. They 
are, for all practical purposes, influenced by each other. Still, it is useful to distinguish 
them for analytical purposes.   
 
3.1.2 The contradiction between short-term needs and long-term 
goals 
The duration dilemma (Paris and Sisk 2009a:307) derives from the fact that state 
building, by nature, is a long-term activity. At the same time, the local population will 
expect fast improvements of their living conditions as a result of the presence of 
foreign forces. Furthermore, heavy international presence over a lengthy period of 
time may represent a source of hostility itself (Paris and Sisk 2009a:307). Elections 
can be held quickly and operations initiated fast but it takes time to consolidate 
political institutions, administrative capacity and a system for upholding the rule of 
law (Paris and Sisk 2009a:307).  
Arranging elections may also temporarily boost violence levels. In addition, countries 
contributing to state building abroad seem less willing to deploy soldiers to open-
ended and lengthy operations, not least because of casualty sensitivity in the opinion 
at home. Simultaneously, harsh security-conditions and civilian suffering make both 
local and international actors call for quick impact and progress from the international 
forces.  
                                                                                                                                           
to be experienced as dilemmas. Aspects of this problem are discussed in this chapter, but under challenges due to the 
characteristics of the Afghan forces, because the loyalty of these actors tends to vary and might constitute a source of 
frustration. 
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Military advisors are instructed to support the establishment of long-term functioning 
institutions in the area of security, law and order. Simultaneously, they must cope 
with day-to-day security issues with a much shorter time horizon, well aware that their 
contribution is limited in time and scope. Regular foreign forces may have security 
and short-term stability as their main concern. Military advisors are likely to share this 
concern, but are primarily concerned with long-term development of the host nation’s 
forces. Short-term and long-term requirements tend to conflict.  
Based on this dilemma, it becomes interesting to ask whether Norwegian officers 
experienced their short-term efforts as counter-productive compared to the long-term 
purpose of the operation. 
3.1.3 The dependency dilemma 
The dependency dilemma is described by Paris and Sisk as the danger of fostering 
dependency among the host-nation population on the international presence 
(2009a:308). During state-building, large flows of assistance and outside ‘hands-on’ 
management by external actors may create institutions that rely heavily on continued 
external aid and assistance. This may work against the goal of transition to self-
governance10 (Paris and Sisk 2009a:308).  The large inflows of money, equipment 
and increased military support to the Afghan Security Forces inevitably create 
patterns of dependency that may delay or even reverse NATO’s strategy of transition 
of ownership to Afghan institutions.  
For instance, the Afghan Army’s dependency on close air support grew as the 
insurgency escalated from 2005 to 2007 (Giustozzi 2008). The Afghan Army has 
neither the personnel nor the resources to handle close air support, nor are they likely 
to get it in a foreseeable future. It is therefore administrated through foreign advisors. 
                                              
10
 In the complex dynamics of war-torn societies, the dilemmas are intertwined: Host-nation dependency on external 
support may increase over time, for instance by creating passivity within the local population. Also, a high level of host-
nation dependency might increase the duration of an international presence (Paris and Sisk 2009:307). 
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Foreign advisors aim at promoting Afghan self-sustainability in the harsh conditions 
of combat. However, in war, letting the host nation’s security forces ‘learn by 
consequences’ has a high price. Advisors might plausibly experience a dilemma when 
their resources save lives in the short run, but prevent learning and independence in 
the longer run. Military advisors might find themselves in the unpleasant situation of 
having to choose between helping the host-nation forces in combat, but not so much 
that they become overly dependent on future support. 
In light of the contradictions of dependency, one might ask whether military advisors 
have experienced whether supporting the ANSF through procedures and capacities 
actually made them less able to operate independently in the longer term.   
3.1.4 Ethical dilemmas caused by illegal or unethical behaviour by 
the indigenous forces 
The legitimacy of military forces, both foreign and indigenous, is absolutely critical in 
operations to build stability in war-torn societies (Berdal 2009:97). At the same time, 
it lies in the nature of military advising that the forces you are there to support have a 
different military quality than your own forces and their ethical standards may, 
perhaps, conflict with your own values or the values you are set to protect and 
promote. The difference in ethical standing is not a dilemma in itself. The dilemma 
arises when the advisor has to make decisions that might violate his or her own ethical 
standards. These are tough choices, and may lead to both practical and ethical 
challenges. Two examples, plundering of civilians and corruption, may illustrate the 
problem. 
First, an example based on personal experience. Afghan Security Forces are known to 
steal food, farm animals and even plunder Afghan civilians during operations, 
sometimes even with the blessing of their Afghan commanders. As most Norwegian 
officers are well aware, the loss of a goat could be extremely critical for the average 
Afghan family. Misconduct like this clearly corrodes the perceived legitimacy of both 
ISAF and Afghan forces, especially in the eyes of the local population. This 
  21 
plundering of civilians is neither easy to expose nor to stop. Giustozzi argues that lack 
of army discipline mainly results from “unwillingness of its foreign officers to take 
the responsibility for punishing errant behaviour” (2009:40). Giustozzi’s point is 
valid, but in other cases, discipline in the Afghan Army can be very harsh, including 
ruthless and violent punishment of soldiers, which advisors also might consider 
unethical. However, advisors are dependent on upholding rapport and a good 
relationship with their counterparts. Second, corruption in the ANSF is another 
widespread problem that escalated because of increased deployment of Afghan forces 
among the population (Giustozzi 2009:39). Advisors may find corruption ethically 
problematic, and support an institution which needs to counter corruption to achieve 
legitimacy. Simultaneously, they might have to condone a certain level of corruption, 
for example to maintain good relations with their Afghan counterparts, or to initiate 
and achieve progress in local projects and operations. 
Confronting the counterpart with these difficult issues, especially in front of others, 
may dilute the trust an advisor is so dependent on. Also, the advisors’ approach is 
rarely to directly interfere in the actions of soldiers, since they do not have formal 
command authority over their counterparts or their counterparts’ organization 
(Ramsey 2006a:155,161,165). They are to encourage and enable the Afghan officers 
to take that responsibility themselves. To directly interfere with other officers’ 
subordinates, and go outside the chain of command, is problematic and rarely 
appreciated by any officers, regardless of nationality. 
The core of this dilemma is that the local forces may do things you do not appreciate, 
and even strongly condemn, and which may gravely erode the legitimacy of both the 
advisor and the advised. The advisors may feel bound uphold their ethical standards 
and intervene. Simultaneously, they are absolutely dependent on sustaining a working 
relationship with their counterparts. They are, after all, human beings that know that 
they have to live with the decision of interfering or not in what they consider 
unethical behaviour. Therefore it seemed important to ask the Norwegian officers 
whether they have had to support or refrain from intervening in behaviour conducted 
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by afghan forces that violated their ethical principles or the overall purpose of the 
operation.  
3.1.5 In accordance with western military doctrines or “the Afghan 
way”? 
One dilemma derives from the fact that western military doctrines may be imposed on 
Afghan Security Forces. Foreign procedures, imperatives and goals that are taught 
tend to be strange and unfamiliar for the host nation. Operations that are planned and 
conducted by Afghan authorities and forces may not be in accordance with the outside 
force’s overall purpose.  An example might be how the insurgency is to be countered, 
because the ANA presumably lack skills in counter-insurgency operations (Giustozzi 
2009:41). The philosophy of counter-insurgency, as a military strategy, lies in the 
integrated civil and military efforts to secure the local population and win their 
support.11 “Clear”, “hold” and “build” are phases in counter-insurgency operations. 
Military forces are to clear an area for insurgents, hold the area over a period of time 
in order to enable the last phase of building the civil society through promoting 
development and governance (US Army 2006:5-18). These are complex operations 
with many counterintuitive paradoxes for military forces. The population is the centre 
of gravity rather than the enemy, and when countering an insurgency, “legitimacy is 
the objective” (US Army 2006:1-21).  
Norwegian officers have reported that the Afghan National Army (ANA) seem, for 
various reasons, to favour the offensive “clear” phase, and avoid the defensive “hold” 
phase.12 Holding an area over time is risky, demands extensive man-power and often 
results in a high degree of attrition. It might also be perceived as less prestigious than 
                                              
11
 There is a good deal of literature on counter-insurgency (COIN). It includes American doctrines and field manuals, 
Norwegian interpretations and a comprehensive, scholarly literature on the perspectives of COIN which this analysis cannot 
discuss. In short, building host-nation security forces is an activity described in current COIN doctrines (McBreen 2008, 
US Army 2006, Stoker 2008:5). Though several texts emphasizes the importance of cooperation with indigenous forces 
(US Army 2006:2-4, US Army 2008:6-8, Cassidy 2006:61), they tend to only briefly touch upon the difficulties of 
cooperation and transfer of responsibility to the host-nation. 
12
 In personal conversation with the author. 
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killing the enemy in offensive operations. Defensive operations with a high number of 
troops are dependent on good logistical support, and logistics may be one of the 
ANA’s weakest qualities. If ANA conducts an offensive operation and withdraws too 
fast it might be very counterproductive for achieving local support and legitimacy. 
The dilemma arises when the Afghans initiate and conduct operations that are 
perceived to be counterproductive from a western perspective, and corrode rather than 
increase support among the population. Military advisors are there to support 
operations that are decided by the host-nation force, but simultaneously work in 
accordance with the overall purpose of countering the insurgency through achieving 
local support and legitimacy. Since the Afghan advisory efforts are built on western 
military doctrines (Mathiesen 2009:37), it is interesting to ask whether the advisors 
have experienced a dilemma between supporting Afghan operations, and 
simultaneously operating in accordance with western military doctrines and the 
purpose of the operation. 
3.2 Challenges related to professional expertise of the 
outside force and the situation in the area of operations 
3.2.1 Introduction to the literature 
The reviewed literature consists of military and civilian research, biographies, 
quantitative studies of soldiers and officers, historical analyses, military reports and 
tactical lessons learned. Two books from the US Army Combat Studies Institute by 
Robert D. Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces” (2006a) and “Advice for Advisors” 
(2006b) are the most detailed studies on military advising. The first is a historical 
case-study, in which several authors analyze the American cooperation with host-
nation forces in Vietnam, Korea and El-Salvador. The second is a supplementing 
anthology and collection of articles from past and present advisors, from Lawrence of 
Arabia in 1917 to the latest war in Iraq. Another book edited by Donald Stoker (2008) 
presents a number of historical cases of military advising, from 1815 to 2007. Stoker 
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focuses especially on the underlying political intent of the contributing countries, and 
the role of private military actors as advisors (2008:2,6).  
As mentioned, literature of a military origin tends to focus on lessons learned and 
further implications for training, selection and future operations instead of causal 
explanations and in-depth analyses of the challenges. The purpose of this review is 
therefore not to detail all the challenges advisors in different contexts may face, but 
rather to search for common denominators across the variety of texts. This literature 
often presents concrete points of “dos and don’ts” when advising indigenous forces, 
here from several authors cited in Ramsey’s book:  
The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study 
of them. (Lawrence 1917:140) 
Advice [the] counterpart forcefully, but not command his unit’ 
(Commandments for KMAG Advisors. 1953:141) 
Avoid offending Vietnamese by showing dislike for their food, their customs, 
their way of life. (Role of the Individual 1962:144) 
Speak in phrases and short sentences (…) maintain the same moral and ethical 
standards in Vietnam as you would at your home station (…) don’t forget for 
a single minute that you may have to go to war with your [indigenous] unit 
(…) don’t compare relative pay-scales. (Advisor “Do’s and Don’ts” 
1962:147-51) 
Stress mutual advantages of good military-civilian relations (…) study your 
counterpart to determine his personality. (Tips to Advisors 1966:155) 
Expect slow progress (…) Do not expect to use your western measuring stick 
for honesty and morals. The same values do not apply (…) Live as close to 
those with whom you work as possible, but don’t go ‘native’.  
(US Army Special Forces Advisors Reference Book 2001:175) (All cited in 
Ramsey 2006a:135-176) 
 
These lists are many and comprehensive in scope; they deal with everything from 
basic survival techniques to more complex cultural challenges. They may seem trivial 
and repetitive, but it should be noted that they nevertheless capture the distilled 
wisdom of field advisors, wisdom that might not be captured in doctrines (Ramsey 
2006a:1). For instance, T.E. Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, wrote twenty-seven 
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points or suggestions for fellow advisors, or “stalking horses for beginners in the 
Arab armies” (1917). One frequently quoted point, number fifteen, is “do not try to do 
too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it 
perfectly” (Lawrence 1917). 
The literature also points to the limits of the role of the military advisors. The 
following quote of Major David H. Marshall (2006), who served as an advisor in the 
Iraqi National Guard, illustrates this point: 
Corruption and fear had polluted the Commandos (…) When all was said and 
done, we had one officer and three soldiers who were willing to stand and 
fight (…) as we learned, simply training, equipping and organizing is not 
enough13 (Marshall 2006:60). 
Despite a comprehensive American effort, the Iraqi commando soldiers failed to do as 
the Americans wanted or advised. It indicates that there are some cultural barriers to 
overcome that go beyond technical, military challenges such as training, equipping 
and organizing.  
In general the literature tends to follow a certain pattern: it points to suggestions or 
dos and don’ts on how to be a good advisor, and when the advised people do not act 
in accordance with the advisors’ preferences, the literature points to cultural, and 
sometimes contextual, differences as explanations. When the advisors quoted above 
failed to motivate the Iraqi commandos, they explained it by stating that “[w]e cannot 
undo the influence and corruption that has existed for hundreds of years” (Marshall 
2006:60, Ramsey 2006a:115). Lawrence explains advice number fifteen, also quoted 
above, with his subsequent sentence (which is not so frequently cited but nevertheless 
important):  
Under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as 
good as, perhaps, you think it is. (Lawrence 1917) 
                                              
13
 These Iraqi soldiers were supposed to be more than regular forces within the Iraqi National Guard (ING), they were 
intended to constitute a reaction force that were willing to ‘stand and fight’, because the commitment of the Iraqi Security 
Forces was questioned and more professional Iraqi soldiers were needed (Marshall 2006:58). They were therefore carefully 
recruited, equipped and trained, but nevertheless not willing to conduct the operation as the Americans wanted them to. 
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In the following I present challenges related to the qualities of the advisory forces and 
challenges related to living and working in a culture that is very different from your 
own. These challenges are related to the moral dilemmas discussed above, but are 
nevertheless of a more practical nature. 
3.2.2 Challenges related to the professional expertise of the 
outside force 
When examining the issue of professional expertise, discussions in the literature tend 
to focus on whether military technical skills or cultural knowledge is the most 
important quality of a good advisor. The authors are divided on what matters most, 
the ability 1) to master the officer’s military “workmanship” or 2) to establish and 
sustain a functional relationship with humans from other cultures. In a survey of the 
literature on the advisory function, professional skills were emphasized as first 
priority. “[A]ll agree (...) that the first qualification for anyone serving in a 
intercultural context is professional competence” (Hickey 1965:172 cited in Ramsey 
2006b:172) . However, the failing of establishing rapport because of lack of cultural 
awareness is where the American advisors are described to have had their greatest 
unrealized potential, especially in light of experiences gained in Vietnam14 
(Westerman 2008:144). Also, some argue that in most cases, “the success of the 
advisor depended as much upon his behavior as upon his professional ability” 
(Hermes 1965:82). 
These two qualities are discussed in two Norwegian studies of military advising in 
Afghanistan. Based on policy documents and interviews with advisors, Haug (2009) 
argues that cultural skills for advisors at the Brigade level and “personal and 
professional credibility” of advisors at the Battalion level (in the field), are more 
important than technical and tactical proficiency (2009:110). Based on interviews 
                                              
14
 Almost none American advisors from the cases of Korea, Vietnam and El-Salvador reported to have felt “tactically, 
technically or militarily unprepared for his duties – even those duties above his rank” (Ramsey 2006a:109). Instead, they 
felt inadequately prepared in the “demanding challenges posed by language, cultural differences and host-nation 
institutional barriers” (Ramsey 2006a:109). 
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with Norwegian advisors in Afghanistan, Nygard also points to the challenge of 
balancing military basic infantry skills and practical training in “being an advisor” 
(2009:67). The literature does not provide a clear-cut answer, and while both types of 
skills are emphasized, what matters most remains undecided. With the above 
discussion as a backdrop, it is interesting to ask which type of competence was felt by 
the advisors to be most important, military expertise or personal ability to establish 
trusting relations across cultures. And was it possible to establish trusting relations 
with less military professional expertise, or without operating closely with the ANSF? 
Language and situational awareness 
Another practical challenge, however trivial it may seem, comes from language 
problems. The advisory units are normally heavily dependent on translators, which 
further complicates interaction between the advisor and his counterpart. In addition, 
several languages are spoken within the Afghan forces.  
Sometimes, advisors are “unaware of the implications of their actions and inactions” 
(Hermes 1965:82-83), and therefore described as partly blind and prone to frequently 
misunderstand, also because of differences beyond the language. As an example, it is 
argued that the Dari word for operation, “amaliyaat”, has two fundamentally different 
meanings for the Afghans. One of them means decisive combat – find and kill the 
enemy. The other refers to military presence to uphold law and order (Nygard 
2009:81), a very defensive mode of operating. Norwegian officers have often noted 
this as one of the reasons why Afghans are either reluctant or eager to initiate 
operations. But military interpreters argue that “amaliyaat” is the linguistic equivalent 
to “operation”,15 and for both languages more words are required to describe “modus 
operandi”, i.e. what kind of operation it is. If that is the case, potential linguistic 
misunderstandings could be cleared up after a discussion with the Afghan officer. 
Based on my own experience, the language problems are seldom the main obstacle in 
                                              
15
 In personal correspondence with the author, available on request to the author by e-mail. “Amaliyaat” is rooted in the 
Arabic word for “acting”, and the interpreters also refer to misunderstandings among Norwegian officers on the Afghan use 
of amaliyaat.  
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intercultural communication, the picture is more complex. The Afghan officers may, 
for instance, be reluctant to act because of lack of orders from superiors to initiate 
operations for fear of consequences if the operation fails.  
Nevertheless, it is pertinent to ask how far language problems or different situational 
awareness obstructed cooperation between the advisor and his counterpart.   
3.2.3 Practical and technical challenges related to the situation in 
the area of operations 
Antonio Giustozzi has pointed to many challenges in the Afghan National Army, most 
importantly illiteracy among soldiers, corruption, changing loyalties among military 
leaders, ethnically dividing lines and low morale (Giustozzi 2009). These challenges 
are deeply rooted in Afghan society. In this section the problems of conflicting 
loyalties, ethnic dividing lines, low combat morale and corruption will be discussed 
since they seem to attract most attention in the literature.16  
First, Giustozzi elaborates on the ANA officer’s conflicting loyalties to rival 
patronage networks inside the army. They include mujahadeen warriors, former pro-
Soviet officers, supporters of local power-brokers as the Junbesh war lord Dostum, 
and the former army chief of staff Bismillah Khan (2009:39). As an officer in the 
Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team told me, fostering local political 
governance sometimes felt like “supporting the least bad bad guys”.17 Patronage 
networks and alliances along the lines of clans, families and ethnicities are very 
common in the Afghan society, also within political institutions, and intercept the 
formal political and military line of command. Since foreign advisors have reported 
spending much time managing rivalry among patronage networks (Giustozzi 
2009:39), it is worth asking whether this applies to the Norwegian advisors as well.  
                                              
16
 For instance, illiteracy is not discussed in this section. Although illiteracy represents a vital social problem for 
Afghanistan, it may not be an insurmountable problem for a combat force with low-tech equipment (Giustozzi 2009:37). 
17
 In personal conversation with the author, Meymaneh, Afghanistan, March 2009. 
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Second, ethnic dividing lines are also a major challenge to the building of national 
institutions in Afghanistan. One may question the strength of the national character of 
the Afghan Security Forces is. Ethnic dividing lines may create challenges both inside 
and outside the security forces. Excluding vital groups from national institutions (like 
the army) is problematic in a state-building perspective (Paris and Sisk 2009a:308). In 
addition, ethnic dividing lines within the army may create conflicting loyalties, 
rivalries and even language problems. On the other hand, a former advisor argues that 
different ethnic groups in ANA provided a more competent force and integrated 
soldiers across ethnic and tribal lines (Byrom 2008:208). 
In both Faryab province and throughout Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency seems to 
be growing demographically in the Pashtun segments of the population. The Pashtuns 
are, to a large extent, excluded from the state-building process. This does not imply 
that all Pashtuns, who constitute almost 39 per cent of the Afghan population, are 
potential spoilers;18 the picture is far more complex. But with Faryab Province as one 
example, both scholars and officers perceive the lack of Pashtun representation or 
inclusion in state-building efforts and the security forces as a problematic and even 
de-stabilizing factor (Lurås 2010:4, Solberg 2010, Caldwell 2010:11, Giustozzi 
2009:38).  
Third, combat morale in the Afghan forces is often measured by attrition rates and 
numbers of deserters, both of which have been high in the ANA, and resulted in a 
high turnover rate and many unmanned positions (Giustozzi 2009:40). Desertion may 
result from conflicting loyalties, the need to provide for one’s families, or attrition 
through combat operations. The Norwegian forces have been in many combat 
operations with the Afghan forces, and are likely to be aware of such problems. 
                                              
18
 The NATO training mission seems aware of the challenges regarding recruitment and ethnicity in the Afghan National 
Security Forces: The Pashtuns are underrepresented in the ANSF, especially in the south (Caldwell 2010:11).  
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Last, but not least, corruption in the ANSF not only creates moral dilemmas, but also 
logistical problems and “bureaucratic chokepoints” in the Afghan Army (Giustozzi 
2009:39). The logistical problems of fuel, ammunition and other supplies are 
tremendous, partly due to corruption. On the other hand, they are always scarce 
resources in war (an old saying is that generals discuss strategy during peace, but 
logistics during war). Since logistical problems and corruption scandals tend to define 
the debate on Afghanistan, it is worth asking Norwegian officers whether they 
perceived them as a challenge.  
In light of these four problems, it is worth asking if Norwegian officers found 
changing loyalties, ethnic dividing lines, low morale and corruption in the Afghan 
forces to constitute a source of frustration and/or practical obstacle for their work. 
3.3 Cultural Challenges 
3.3.1 Challenges of living close to indigenous people 
A preliminary analysis of soldiers living close to indigenous forces and native people, 
suggests that cultural differences between the advisor and his counterpart may be a 
source of psychological strain for the advisor. To live, eat, sleep and engage in 
combat in close proximity to the local forces may cause severe “cultural stress” to the 
soldiers because of the interaction with indigenous people (Azari et al. 2010:592). 
The tensions that arise from exposure to a different culture and loss of one’s own 
familiar environment, could represent a “stressor that generates visible stress 
responses” (Azari et al. 2010:590). The authors do not directly point to advisors as an 
exposed group, but most of their cases and examples are based on research on 
advisory units, like the RAND study from Vietnam (Hickey 1965). In addition, some 
studies have shown that officers run the risk of developing negative attitudes and a 
condescending jargon towards the indigenous people and the security forces in similar 
operations (Mæland 2003:24, Røkenes 2005:30). 
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Military advisors often live, eat and fight together with indigenous people, and are 
dependent on them. They might therefore be exposed to the stresses described above. 
It is therefore interesting to ask whether the Norwegian advisors experienced special 
challenges related to living and operating with Afghans over time.     
3.3.2 Professional identity – accelerator or obstacle for 
cooperation? 
Differences in professional identity, or military culture, may represent a challenge 
when officers from different nations and cultures cooperate closely. Some of the 
authors quoted above suggest that severe cultural challenges are likely to be due to the 
peculiarity of American military culture rather than the advisor’s personal skills, and 
that the US Army tends to “train other nations’ armies as our clones” (Baritz 
1985:143). This ‘gap between cultures’ is particularly visible in the case of Vietnam, 
were it is described as a “linguistic and cultural barrier ... that was almost impossible 
for the advisor to breach” (Ramsey 2006a:44).  As an adviser observed, this cultural 
scepticism worked both ways. “[W]hat ultimately emerged was a situation in which 
the Americans look down on the Vietnamese, who were at the same time looking 
down on the Americans” (Ramsey 2006a:44). This came from a lack of cultural 
awareness which “constituted a major weakness for effective training and advising 
(...) and was symbolic of a larger failure in the entire US effort during the war in 
South-East Asia” (Westerman 2008:144). Ramsey argues that the “American way”, 
through “our way”, “can do”, “make it happen”, “get over it” and “just do it” seemed 
quicker and better, but these slogans became substitutes for thought and analysis, and 
the final result was no better than what the host-nation forces performed (2006a:113).  
These issues could plausibly have been caused by some officer’s indoctrinated 
willingness to act and grasp the initiative, which is enhanced in confrontation with 
lack of host-nation progress. This may have root in the national military culture and 
the officer’s professional identity. According to this logic, military culture and 
professional identity may hinder the advisor and their counterpart to develop a 
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trusting relationship. On the other hand, both the advisors and their counterparts 
belong to the military profession; to some extent they share a common identity of 
being soldiers. This common ground could improve their ability to establish a 
functional relationship. 
A statement of a young American lieutenant who served as senior district advisor in 
Vietnam may illustrate the problem.  
I was determined and eager to do my best (…) In many ways I controlled life 
and death of thousands of people (…) Most of the responsibilities were not 
truly mine, but I knew that the district chief would approve anything I did, and 
if I didn’t do it, I had the definite impression that very little would be done. 
Perhaps it was just youthful, American arrogance that made me take those 
powers that were outside my rightful reach (…) but when I had the chance to 
get something done I by-God took it! (Donovan 1958:134, cited in Ramsey 
2006a:53)  
 
Ramsey comments on the quote and concludes, “MACV field advisors [in Vietnam] 
remained what they were: American military personnel with all of their capabilities 
and all of their limitations” (2006a:53). An eagerness to act, overwhelming power, or 
just sympathy for the natives may represent a challenge for the advisor when the point 
of your task is to let someone else do the job.  
However, strong human mechanisms seem to be at play at the intersection of two 
fundamentally different military cultures. What we can investigate is the ability of 
military culture, either Norwegian or Afghan, to accelerate or hinder advisory efforts. 
3.3.3 Can the advisory role be incompatible with being an officer?  
A final challenge is derived from the potential conflict of having an identity as an 
officer and being set to perform tasks that might be incompatible with their perceived 
identity. This challenge is closely linked to the challenges of military cultures 
discussed above. The anthropologist Simmons has also noticed Lieutenant Donovan’s 
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statement quoted above, and argues that it exemplifies how advisors (and 
anthropologists) in the field risk “going native”19 and lose objectivity, distance and 
the original mission from sight (2003:124). Based on an in-depth analysis of a handful 
military advisors, she argues that the ultimate source of friction and frustration for 
advisors in the field comes from different war aims of the advisor and the nation 
sending those advisors (Simons 2003:129). The advisors feel responsible for and not 
just to, which may cause long-term emotional damage if they feel they are betraying 
their counterparts by ending the mission too early: it might be painful to leave behind 
those you were there to help. Veteran special forces in Iraq (1991) still talk bitterly 
about a betrayal when they left the Kurds (Simons 2003:130). In these situations 
advisors are put in a position where performing as a good advisor to those you are 
there to support may contradict being a good officer and following orders such as 
ending support effort and leaving. To investigate whether this remains true today, one 
may ask to what extent the Norwegian officers perceived their advisory role as 
compatible or consistent with their role as an officer.  
All in all, a variety of challenges, ranging from complex ethical dilemmas to practical 
and cultural problems of culture and for instance corruption, has been presented. This 
review and potential challenges gave rise to a series of questions to ask the 
respondents. The following chapter will present and analyse the findings following 
the same thematic structure as the literature review. 
                                              
19
 “Going native” is described by Simons through two main mechanisms: either when empathy for natives leads to 
sympathy which again leads to loss of objectivity, or when advisors are seduced to act like a “warrior-king” and warps their 
sense of the original mission (Simons 2003:113). 
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4. Findings and analysis 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings from the interviews. The findings will 
be structured thematically like the literature review in chapter three, presenting 
perceptions of ethical challenges first, perceptions of practical and technical 
challenges second, and third, perceptions of cultural challenges. A brief discussion 
will conclude each sub-section. The respondents were also asked several control 
questions, and the answers to them will be presented after the discussion of the 
cultural challenges. Lastly, in order to show how different the answers of some of the 
respondents were, some findings at the fringes of the general material will be 
presented at the end of the chapter.  
4.1 Ethical dilemmas in statebuilding operations 
4.1.1 General impressions and main challenges 
Keeping in mind that the respondents may have experienced other challenges than 
those described in literature, each interview began with a few open questions. The 
officers were asked to describe working with the Afghans in general terms, and what 
they felt was the most challenging part of the work. First and foremost, all 
respondents characterized cooperation as good. They felt appreciated and respected 
by their Afghan partners, and reciprocated in like manner. Sometimes they just 
described the relationship as unproblematic. One respondent compared serving as a 
mentor with his previous contingent in Afghanistan, and said “it felt better in the 
OMLT [mentor unit] because we were closer to them [the Afghan forces]”.  
A majority of the respondents, eight out of ten, mentioned as the biggest challenge 
that the ANSF’s had other intentions or wanted to operate in other ways than they 
themselves. However, they also gave very different reasons for this, ranging from 
ethnic dividing lines in the Afghan leadership, to Afghan forces wanting to do 
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counter-insurgency differently or not conduct operations at all, and that Norwegian 
regulations and guidelines made working with the ANSF difficult. About half of the 
respondents experienced cases where the Afghans had apparently other agendas than 
improving the security situation. The following quotations may illustrate the point. 
The provincial leadership had their own agendas and no interest in 
establishing security in the Pashtun areas [as many consider vital to reduce the 
conflict level]. 
We [Norwegians] do not have an agenda of our own, we want progress. 
We were more idealistic, we saw windows of opportunity for improving the 
security situation… it was frustrating when the Afghans did not want to 
operate for fear of taking the blame. It collided with our understanding of the 
intent. 
Finally, it is worth noting that only one respondent cited his Afghan counterpart as his 
main challenge, and referred to him as “completely incompetent – he totally lacked 
both will and ability”. The other respondents mainly relate the challenges to systems 
and society, for instance circumstances within the ANSF or ISAF organizations, 
cultural factors in Afghanistan or to divergent Norwegian and Afghan objectives. The 
tendency to explain difficulties and deficiencies by reference to cultures and 
organizations, rather than to individuals behaving badly, is also indicative of all the 
findings of this analysis.   
4.1.2 The contradiction between short-term needs and long-term 
goals 
In state-building operations, short-term needs and long-term goals tend to conflict, as 
they did for the officers engaged in the long-term development of the host-nation 
forces and in promoting security and short-term stability. Half of the respondents had 
experienced this dilemma between their short-terms efforts which either were, or 
could be, counterproductive for the long-term purpose of the operation. 
The intuitive answers of the respondents were consistently either yes or no, but their 
interpretation of the long-term objective was more nuanced. Those who denied 
experiencing a dilemma considered the improvement of the Afghan forces as the 
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overall long-term objective – and felt their efforts had contributed to great progress. 
Those who confirmed experiencing a dilemma regarded progress in security and 
development for the local population and improved legitimacy for the Afghan 
government as the main long-term objectives.  
To illustrate the latter, two respondents felt it constituted the most difficult dilemma 
in their work, especially when large and risky operations were initiated by the 
Afghans. One of those respondents described these operations as “short-term 
treatment of the symptoms rather than the causes of the conflict”. Another 
experienced that “state-building in Afghanistan” failed because of “distrust of the 
local political leadership” – the very leadership he was set to work with. For him, the 
dilemma materialized when the Afghan agendas conflicted with what he saw as the 
supreme objective of the longer term, often with an ethnic dimension. For instance, 
some respondents saw pushing security and development into the Pashtun areas 
(where the insurgency seems to grow) as their core task, but often the Afghan forces 
did not agree. As an example, an officer had to join an ad-hoc operation to help a pro-
government village, a village of the same ethnicity as the Afghan provincial 
leadership. The respondent described this as “short-term fire-extinguishing”. The 
original operation (to push security into the Pashtun areas) collapsed because the 
Afghan forces refused to operate there, and Norwegian guidelines prevented him 
from operating alone: 
The Afghans wanted me to go and open the road to village X [name of 
village] … should I really support this operation when the Afghans want to 
treat the symptoms rather than causes of the conflict? I was under pressure, I 
could not initiate operations alone because of Norwegian guidelines, and I 
could not get the ANSF into the Pashtun areas. 
At a more practical level, those who experience a dilemma often illustrated it with 
cases where the ANSF’s use of force, bad behaviour and way of operating felt 
counter-productive because it undermined the forces’ legitimacy. In one case, an 
ANA truck had accidentally run over and destroyed a sales booth at the bazaar (city 
centre). The officer tried to convince the ANA that they had to sort out the problem 
themselves and help the local salesmen, 
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but they refused and said ’it ’ll only be trouble’... we had to evacuate two 
Afghan civilians ourselves... they did not see that as their responsibility. 
The ANA’s focus on operations like cordon and search, ambush, assaults and 
confiscations instead of seriousness, show of force and presence [to maintain 
law and order] alienated the population and created ‘accidental guerrillas’.20  
If the force had to withdraw from an area too early after combat, or because there was 
a high risk of civilian or own casualties, it exacerbated the dilemma and feeling of 
having to participate with a heavy heart. One officer even argued, “every time we 
break contact [participate in a fire-fight], we lose.... We strengthen their unity against 
us.” 
 A small number of respondents gave an account of their time perspective or 
elaborated “long-term” and “short-term” in concrete terms. However, members of the 
PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) spoke of a frustratingly short horizon of six 
months, or a single rotation (change of command), and members of the OMLT (army 
mentoring units) spoke of the challenges in a perspective of five to seven years. In 
addition, the PRT commanders saw the long-term – short-term dilemma as the most 
fundamental challenge of those presented above. In contrast, the OMLT commanders 
almost dismissed it. 
All in all, the dilemma is felt, though not by everyone, and beside the fact that the 
Afghans may act or operate in a way perceived to be counterproductive, the problem 
seems to be perceived as manageable. None argues for not operating with the ANSF; 
on the contrary, it is seen an argument for working closer together to prevent these 
situations. The extent to which the respondents experienced a dilemma depends on 
what they considered to be the long-term objective. That is not to say that some 
Norwegian officers do not consider peace in Afghanistan as the main and greater 
good, but rather that some are very concerned about the long-term development of the 
Afghan forces, which they see as their main objective. They are thus able to distance 
themselves from a temporary deterioration of the security situation. However, those 
                                              
20
 The respondent here explicitly referred to David Kilcullan’s expression and book title “The Accidental Guerrilla: 
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One” (Kilcullen 2009).  
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PRT officers who liaise with several, more complex Afghan institutions than the army 
mentor teams are more affected by this state-building dilemma than the other groups. 
The focus on development of the Afghan forces as the long-term objective makes the 
dilemma avoidable to some extent, but not completely.  
4.1.3 The dependency dilemma 
The danger of fostering dependency among those you are there to support may bring 
about tough choices for military advisors. Their resources and capacities may save 
lives in the short run, but prevent learning and development in the longer. The use of 
close air support has been much discussed in this context not least by participants in 
the wider debate over Afghanistan. 
This is the dilemma most respondents agreed was a potential challenge; seven in ten 
respondents experienced it as a dilemma. The other three saw it as challenge, but not a 
difficult choice as such, mostly because of they gave priority to their own safety 
during combat. As one respondent commented, “in those situations you want to come 
home as well; you have to use what you have got.” 
While the respondents largely agreed on that the danger of dependency is an 
important challenge, there is a marked division in what they believed created 
dependency and whether the use of foreign capacities actually exacerbated Afghan 
dependency or not. One illustrating example is the use of close air support (CAS) or 
similar offensive non-Afghan capacities. Those who denied seeing any problem with 
the use of these capacities argued that they either held back those capacities and 
limited their use, or made the ANSF sufficiently aware about planning and the 
weapons’ limitations, or thought it was easy to choose for instance close air support 
because they considered their own security threatened. As an officer explained,  
We were very conscious about this, we saw the danger, but saved our 
capacities as long as possible… air bombs were used when we saw no other 
options. We gave target designations to the ANA rather than firing ourselves.   
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On the other side, those who question the use of close air support nevertheless agree 
that it is a difficult problem; several emphasize the unwillingness of Afghans to 
operate alone because, as one respondent explained it, 
[i]f they brought coalition forces [ISAF], no matter who, they knew they 
would get air support, they told me themselves. 
Another argued that lack of confidence in own skills and dependency among the 
Afghans had already appeared: 
They didn’t trust their own skills.… Once when we spotted Taliban fighters 
on a hillside, I rejected his [Afghan CP] request for close air support.… Then 
he said ‘then we cannot do this’, I said ‘yes we can’… the use of air support is 
very short-term in many respects, they feel very dependent on air support… 
you go down there as a force multiplier, but you are the one who does the 
fighting at long distances… 
However, many respondents also spoke of great progress and how much the Afghan 
Forces learned from the use of foreign capabilities, and indeed how to utilize their 
own capacities at the battlefield.  
Two more cases are worth mentioning since they flesh out the picture of dependency. 
First, an Afghan company commander was to hold and secure a village together with 
local police and arbakee (local militia/police). All were expecting additional fighting. 
The Norwegian officer had to choose between  
staying with our firepower that probably would have helped them a lot, or, as 
we chose, to go home and let them handle it themselves. Sometimes you have 
to let go of the bike if they’re ever going to learn to ride it. They [the ANA] 
stayed there for eighteen days, with troops in contact… they were praised for 
that, and I felt they grew from it…   
In this situation, the ANA was seen to have made great strides and the problem of 
leaving them was manageable. Second, difficult situations of dependency are not just 
tied to foreign firepower and combat. One respondent saw the Afghan’s logistical 
issues as just as challenging:  
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They lacked the ammunition to test-fire their weapons, and we were going on 
an operation. I had to choose between getting ammunition for them, or leaving 
without it… or without water or fuel.… Their logistical system needs you to 
say no. But it is tough to try and make their logistics good when you know it 
is poor.… They had to operate without winter clothes… and you know you 
could have rectified the situation with a stroke of the pen… that is, in many 
ways, the daily stress you’re under. 
 
All in all – even though dependency is perceived as a dilemma, it is not consider an 
insurmountable problem because the respondents saw progress among those they 
trained. Dependency is perceived as something they had a stake in and responsibility 
for, naturally, since it touches the core of the mission they were given by the 
Norwegian government (to make the Afghan forces independent). Nevertheless, when 
operations and contingents go fairly well, it is plausible to think that they should have 
let the Afghans shoulder more responsibility. As one respondent commented after he 
unconsciously took the lead of an Afghan operation:  
We ended up leading the operation… you do a lot of things you think are right 
there and then, but at the end of the day you find out that they should had 
coordinated themselves. 
 
4.1.4 Ethical dilemmas caused by illegal or unethical behaviour by 
the indigenous forces 
The core of this dilemma is that Norwegian officers might have to support indigenous 
forces who are acting illegally or unethically. Military advisors may feel morally 
compelled to intervene, but may unable to do so due to many factors, for instance the 
need to maintain good relations, or because interfering might worsen an ethical 
problem.  
This is the dilemma over which the group is most obviously divided. Half of the 
respondents denied that it was a dilemma at all, and substantiated their contention 
with cases illustrating how honourable the Afghans were. The following quotations 
provide some examples. 
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The only thing I saw was when X [Afghan Commander] caught a soldier in 
smoking hashish, the Commander was sad, disappointed and confound. 
Their interpretation of the rules of engagement and use of force was very 
close to ours. 
The village elder came to us afterwards… he told that the [Afghan] soldiers 
had searched all the houses but not stolen anything, even though there were 
money lying around in the open… then I felt very proud of the [Afghan] 
company’. 
You read about women who get exposed to horrible things. Luckily I never 
experienced that or such extreme dilemmas. 
Second, the half that experienced it as a dilemma told stories which, in contrast to 
those of the former group, showed the opposite: Brutal or unethical behaviour, 
uncritical judgement of potential civilian casualties, looting and lack of understanding 
for proportional use of force. Several described instances in which the life of civilians 
could be at stake. One respondent experienced this repeatedly when he and his 
Afghan unit several times came under sudden enemy fire: 
The ANA fired back towards some houses… they started firing quickly and 
uncritically. There might have been enemies there, but we tried to stop them – 
you cannot fire at civilians.… 
In another case, we took fire from a village.… The Commander ordered 
mortars and machine guns to ‘fire at the village with all you’ve got’.… They 
could have shot at their own forces… the value of a life and collateral damage 
is not like we see it… if they take fire from a built-up area, they fire back… 
they are pretty trigger-happy.21 
The respondent argued in terms of duty ethics in saying it was wrong per se to use 
violence against possible innocent victims of a fire fight. Another respondent faced a 
similar ethical challenge, with maybe even higher stakes: 
                                              
21In this context, the respondent referred to “trigger happy” as the tendency to open fire because of nervousness and fear in 
combat situations, and not extended particular wish or will to shoot as such.  
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In some cases, we saw through our optics that they shot towards an area where 
there were children. We told them so, but they said everyone in that area was 
Taliban.… Compared to our background, children are not guilty of anything, 
but their attitude was totally different: It could have been kids, but than they 
were resupplying Taliban with water and ammunition. Children are not 
innocent in their eyes.  
Some respondents saw corruption, harsh discipline and other actions as ethically 
problematic, though how far they felt it was right or possible to intervene varies. 
Some quotations regarding unethical behaviour run as follows: 
The ANA had stolen melons, animals, food... I did not intervene, but I told 
them it is not productive in the longer term. 
The ANA’s are afraid of the dark. When it is dark and they see something, or 
they think they see something, they shoot at it. That was something I tried to 
stop, but I almost had to run in front of their guns and say “there is nothing 
there, don’t shoot… and if it is something there, it is definitely not the 
enemy!. 
The ANA shot a horse (collateral damage), and that caused a tense 
atmosphere. ISAF did not pay reparation because ANA shot it. And ANA was 
not interested because they meant the locals sympathized with the enemy. 
You cannot change the mindset of grown-up people.… He had been in 
Norway and learned about human rights and that beating prisoners is not 
allowed. So he made other captives beat the prisoner. 
Violations of the rules of engagement in the use of force, weapons and firepower 
seemed to be the tipping point for intervening immediately. Less serious problems 
like corruption, discipline and looting seem to be handled by advice rather than 
intervention.  The quotations above essentially represent a consequentialist ethic: that 
violence towards civilians will increase hatred and risk the overall mission (Syse 
2005:51).  
Harsh physical discipline or “mild” violence towards Afghan soldiers happens, but is 
rarely considered sufficiently brutal to be problematic. Half of the respondents had 
seen physical discipline and described it as “relatively harmless”, just a “bitch slap”, a 
“smack on the back of the head” or simply “some push-ups if they were AWOL 
[absent without leave]”. A few respondents felt they had to intervene, when the 
violence was perceived to be overly brutal. The respondents seem to consider this 
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discipline and violence as necessary, culturally unchangeable behaviour or harmless 
compared to what they had expected. As one of them commented,  
I did not agree when the CO [commanding officer] smacked a soldier in his 
face because he pointed his weapon in the wrong direction. But that is how 
they work; you have to accept some episodes like that. 
Corruption, which is repeatedly discussed in the literature and in the debate on 
Afghan security forces, is surprisingly absent from discussions among respondents. 
Those who managed to expose corruption described it as a culturally unchangeable 
phenomenon and it was difficult to act on suspicions because, as one said, “We had to 
be a 100 per cent sure before we did anything about it”. Finally, it should be noted 
that younger or non-mentoring officers whose relations with their Afghan counterpart 
were less personal, were more likely to be frustrated by unethical ANSF behaviour.   
 
Most problematic was unnecessary or uncritical use of force, because it could lead to 
civilians getting killed. Those with experience of serious abuse of power and force, 
putting civilians at risk or looting are clear on that it represented “a logical problem 
when coming to help”, as one respondent noted. The philosopher Henrik Syse points 
to several ethical arguments to explain why it is problematic when non-combatants 
become victims (2005:50). And those ethical arguments are reflected in what the 
respondents say as well, for instance that it is wrong per se (deontological argument) 
to hurt or not shield non-combatants, or creates a kind of soldier which we do not 
want to identify ourselves (virtue-ethical argument) (2005:51).  
In contrast, those who had not experienced such ethical dilemmas had good opinions, 
and were even very proud of the good behaviour in the Afghan units they followed. It 
underlines how in this dilemma personal experience makes the most difference. In the 
two previous dilemmas the respondents had to consider whether operations were 
counterproductive or if ANSF dependency grew in the longer term, which are more 
abstract problems. That might explain why the answers are more consistent here. 
Problems with corruption, discipline and plundering seem manageable. This may be 
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because they expected the problems to be more serious, or because it just did not 
cause dilemmas compared with the other examples discussed.  
4.1.5 In accordance with western military doctrines or “the Afghan 
way” 
This dilemma arises when Afghan forces initiate and conduct operations that are 
perceived to be counterproductive, too risky or in breach of the overall objectives 
according to western military standards, and military advisors still have to support the 
Afghan way of operating.  
It was a dilemma for about half of the respondents that Afghan forces operated in 
ways that conflicted with western military doctrines or ISAF’s way of operating. The 
answers differed a great deal, but common to all was the sentiment, “we were always 
joining them”, as one put it. Many experienced episodes, as previously discussed, in 
which the Afghan forces operated in ways that felt counterproductive, unethical or 
made them more dependent. But almost none of the respondents felt this was 
sufficient reason for not operating together with them, or that it violated ISAF’s 
general purpose. The respondents almost always joined their Afghan fellows on their 
missions, either by bending their own guidelines, accepting a higher risk, successfully 
influencing the Afghan plan, or agreeing on mutually acceptable solutions during the 
planning process. Some respondents found the question irrelevant, because the 
challenge was mostly to convince the ANSF to operate at all, not whether they 
managed complex operations or not. The following quotations may illustrate these 
findings: 
He meant we should dress in Afghan clothes and sneak in by night.... His plan 
was madness, but luckily it was easy to get him to change his mind.… 
There were some meaningless operations, or foolish from a military 
perspective, but we were always with them.… We had to show some 
willingness to cooperate, but if something had gone wrong it would have been 
hard for me afterwards.… We tried to turn the focus so they at least learned 
something. 
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We did not feel safe in the way they cleared vulnerable points [potential road-
bomb sites], but still we had to follow them... so we educated them in that 
[route clearance] and felt much safer. 
We always agreed in the end... though it is difficult to say who affected the 
other most. 
The necessity of “being out there” may be explained by the perception of acting in 
accordance with the overall objective, even when the Afghan plan was not in 
accordance with the same objectives.  
Norwegian guidelines and regulations are problematic 
Some cases illustrate another dilemma not described in the literature; having to 
choose between national guidelines or joining the afghan operations. As two 
respondents explained 
You cannot follow them because of lack of medical evacuation, helicopters or 
other [Norwegian/ISAF] regulations prohibits you… your conscience and 
ethics makes you want to, but you can’t… as commander in charge you have a 
high responsibility for that regulations are followed... we bend the rules for 
following them, but we also have to say no… that is maybe the biggest 
dilemma., 
The doctrinal approach [on COIN] and [Norwegian] guidelines are impossible 
to uphold. Should I participate in the operation, well aware of that the ANSF 
could never hold the area, or should I refuse to participate? I always 
participated and more or less gave a damn in those regulations. 
In the cases quoted above, the dilemma is turned upside down: the respondents felt it 
hard to choose between national guidelines and the overall purpose of the operation, 
in contrast to the predicted dilemma between the Afghan way of operating and the 
overall purpose. Several respondents (mostly but not always from the PRT) also 
emphasized the difficulty of complying with Norwegian regulations. It is sometimes 
impossible to act in accordance with them. At the same time, they were frustrated 
with the lack of overall national objectives.  
All in all, two conclusions can be drawn. First, even though the extent to which this 
was experienced as a dilemma varied, respondents agreed that they almost always 
chose to participate in the operations. It indicates that the Norwegian officers saw 
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operating together with the Afghan forces as extremely important and mostly in line 
with the general purpose of their mission. Second, others see this dilemma as less 
important. Plausible explanations are that sometimes the Afghans did not want to 
operate at all, Norwegian regulations were more of a problem than Afghan plans, and 
often it was possible to reach agreement on how to operate. Another explanation is 
that without joining field operations and following the Afghan forces, no matter how 
poor their plan or performance was, you made yourself irrelevant as an advisor, 
unable to change either the outcome of the operation or ANSF’s behaviour in the 
field.  
4.1.6 Unethical behaviour causes challenges when civilians are at 
risk 
The dilemmas addressed in the literature on state-building in war-torn societies were 
also experienced by some of the respondents, but not unambiguously and with many 
nuances. Most dilemmas were perceived to be manageable; the overall impression 
from the material is that the operation still felt meaningful for the respondents. 
Nevertheless, this seems valid only to a certain point, i.e. when civilian lives are at 
stake because of the Afghans’ behaviour. The respondents clearly perceived such 
behaviour as problematic in many respects, in terms of consequentialism (that 
violence towards civilians risks the overall mission) and virtue ethics (that this 
behaviour is something we do not wish to identify with).  
4.2 Challenges related to professional expertise of the 
outside force and the situation in the area of operations 
The literature reviewed on military advising presents a variety of “dos and don’ts”, 
what constitutes necessary competence and potential cultural challenges advisors may 
face. These challenges are related to the ethical dilemmas discussed above, but are 
nevertheless of a more practical nature. The findings and discussions after each sub-
paragraph follow sequentially.  
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4.2.1 Challenges related to the professional expertise of the 
outside force 
The literature discusses whether military skills or cultural competence is most vital to 
succeed in the advisory role, and the vital importance of the ability to establish trust in 
that respect. The respondent were therefore asked which competence they saw as 
most important, how trust was gained across cultures, and to what extent it was 
possible to gain trust without operating together with the ANSF or without extended 
military competence.  
Type of competence 
The majority of the respondents emphasize the ability to gain trust as the most 
important skill, though a few departed from that conclusion and underlined military 
skills and technical competence as overriding in order to survive at the battlefield. As 
one commented, “basic soldier skills, to handle your weapon, orientation, the radio 
and first aid, are what matter to survive”. A more thorough analysis of the 
respondent’s answers reveals greater variance, especially in how they experienced 
establishing trust between the advisor and the advised. About half of the respondents 
argued that “being a good military” fostered trust in the form of respect. Being a good 
military was explained as respect they enjoyed as a result of their rank, position, time 
of service, age, looks and other exterior factors that intuitively evoke a sense of 
esteem and reputation rather than respect gained by relations between persons. The 
following quotations illustrate how this kind of trust was gained: 
Position and merits were things I consciously played on. 
I was his age, I had been a battalion commander myself, I had been in 
Afghanistan before.… Those things together with personal qualities... 
We enjoyed great respect. Respect because of the skills we had. 
If you show incompetence, you come out wrong. 
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I am big (physically) and gained respect because that, because of my age, I’ve 
lived for a while, I have kids and that provided an important common 
platform, and I’ve experienced things.…  But the respect we showed them [my 
emphasis] was more important than all that. 
Interestingly, many reasoned like the last respondent quoted above; they corrected or 
adjusted their answers during the conversation and focused more on how to gain trust 
by means of other qualities than military proficiency. In following their reasoning 
many ended up emphasizing people skills such as humility, “genuinely lik[ing] other 
people” and being “jovial, social and fairly all right” as two respondents put it. This 
may reflect how they experienced working together chronologically. First they had to 
master the environment, confirm that their military skills were sufficient to be 
accepted among the Afghans, and handle the military challenges of combat. 
Thereafter, people skills were considered most important when it came to handling 
the entire mission and all aspects of their advising job. 
Cultural knowledge was not highlighted by many, but being polite, using ‘horse sense’ 
(common sense), being a good guest and spending time off with one’s counterpart. 
“Horse sense” and “humility” were exemplified by two respondents as respecting 
religious customs even though it could damage their ability to operate: 
The first thing the new American officer wanted to do was to stop their 
religious education.… I asked him ‘what kind of nonsense is that?’ He said 
they had a contact in the Ministry of Defence and ‘we’re going to put an end 
to this’.… We knew it wouldn’t work, and he returned quickly and empty 
handed. 
For instance Ramadan, we had to respect it but not close shop completely.… I 
had to read his mood, and tell him that he could not cancel a mission he was 
responsible for. 
It is interesting that most respondents did not emphasize wider cultural competence or 
expertise, but rather the qualities of being attentive, observant and considerate about 
how the Afghan counterparts reacted to their behaviour.  
When asked whether it was possible to gain trust without operating closely with the 
ANSF, the respondents (with one exception) said no, it was not possible. This 
complies with the answers given in paragraph 4.1.5 and indicates that advisors tended 
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to join Afghan forces on operations, even if some of them were experienced as less 
productive or posing a higher risk. Taking part was perceived as being in accordance 
with the higher objectives, and vital to gain trust. For instance, as one respondent 
explained, “fortunately, we got a contact [fire-fight] together with the ANA early in 
our contingent”, so relations between him and the ANA went from bad to normal 
after experiencing combat together.  
Language and situational awareness 
Language skills are often described in the literature as a fundamental challenge for 
forces from different nations. But neither language problems nor the use of 
interpreters was perceived as a crucial problem by my respondents. Some experienced 
language problems as a substantial obstacle to cooperation, though they were in the 
minority. Indeed, the Afghan interpreter was seen as aiding their cultural 
understanding and improved the communication between the advisor and the Afghan 
officer. In one case, it was the interpreter who managed to notify the Norwegian 
officers that ANSF was about to open fire in the direction of civilians. In suchlike 
cases, misunderstandings did occur, when inexperienced Afghan interpreters or 
interpreters one did not know or had not cooperated with before, were involved. 
When it comes to different situational awareness as an obstacle of cooperation, there 
was little coherence in the group and the answers differed a great deal. Some argued 
that Norwegian intelligence enhanced cooperation, others that it made planning 
difficult because it diverged from the Afghans’ intelligence. When ANA produced 
their own intelligence and situational understanding it made both the ANA and some 
respondents feel more confident; they “read the situation in villages better than us”, as 
one said. While some experienced vital misunderstandings on the battlefield due to 
their counterpart’s different interpretation of the situation, others said that during 
combat communication became simplified and potential misunderstandings cleared 
up. The Afghan forces were described as both too bold and too cautious compared to 
how the Norwegians assessed the situation and potential threats.  
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4.2.2 Practical and technical challenges related to the situation in 
the area of operations 
Certain characteristics of the Afghan forces are problematized in much of the 
literature, especially when it comes to corruption, the changing loyalties of military 
leaders, ethnic dividing lines both within and outside the institutions, and low combat 
morale (fighting spirit) among Afghan soldiers. In contrast to the literature, the 
overall impression of the respondents to this study did not see these problems as a 
major obstacle to their work, although they were anticipated before deployment and 
respondents saw indications of these problems. Many respondents seem rather to 
reject rather than confirm the problems in the cases they describe, where loyalty in the 
ANA, good morale in combat and a multi-ethnic composition of the force are seen as 
an advantage. For instance, one reported that his Pashtun counterpart got access to a 
meeting with a Pashtun Taliban representative:  
That officer had no problems with revealing the Taliban after the meeting.… 
He gave up name, telephone number and his location. 
Nevertheless, ethnicity and low morale did pose challenges for some of the 
respondents. Many referred to Afghans as racists and knew of ethnic clashes 
occurring in the military units. One respondent reported how  
They spoke of the locals as ‘kandaharis or Talibans all together’… which 
strengthened the stereotypes… the Afghans are very racist. 
Another experienced ethnic clashes in his Afghan unit, even within the leadership:  
The company commander came and joined the volleyball match. He said ‘all 
the Pashtuns go to that side, I’ll only play with the Pashtuns’.  
In addition, successful Afghan officers failed to advance in the system or received 
unpopular missions and tasks because of their ethnicity. 
In cases where combat morale was described as poor, it was explained by two factors. 
First, it was their combat endurance rather than morale that was the main challenge; 
their ability to operate was largely hampered by lack of logistics, supplies and 
equipment like clothes, food and water. Naturally that also affected motivation, but 
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fighting spirit among soldiers was described as high. Second, low morale was 
explained by poor leadership by superior Afghan officers. They lacked a sense of 
responsibility, were afraid of having to take the blame, and lacked the will to 
intervene in the situation. According to one respondent, an Afghan officer told him,  
If we do something good, the Kandak [Battalion] commander takes the credit. 
If it goes to hell, we take the blame. 
The [ANA] company commander called the Kandak commander and 
requested to patrol that area. [The Kandak Commander then said] ‘you can 
try, but at your own risk’. So you don’t have an impression that the battalion 
commander backs his subordinates.    
 
Nevertheless, the respondents spoke of the Afghan soldiers as “real warriors in 
combat” and explained the exceptions to this general rule by lack of equipment and 
poor leadership. As one respondent said about combat morale in the Afghan unit,  
When the winter arrives and the Kandak does not manage to provide 
firewood, fuel and uniforms – they wore t-shirts when it snowed – I 
understood their loss of motivation.… If they had food, ammunition, fuel, sun 
– but not hot – they were ok, they are just like any other soldiers. 
The problem was understandable; an effect of insufficient supplies and poor 
leadership rather than a characteristic of the Afghan forces as a whole.  
 
Even though the respondents mentioned many challenges of a more practical and 
technical nature, few are emphasized as particularly important. This may have a 
variety of explanations. Some problems, for instance ethnicity, were sensed, but not to 
the extent that loyalty seemed threatened or requiring intervention by advisors to 
manage the conflicts. Some problems, for instance corruption, were mentioned, but 
rather as a cause of other challenges like logistics, lack of supplies and equipment. 
Since the advisors have to solve a variety of challenges every day, focusing on 
solutions and progress may be a mechanism to handle day to day realities, or else 
potential challenges in Afghanistan may seem overwhelming. When it comes to 
changing loyalties among security forces, there may be a challenge here, but it is 
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probably at a higher level than the respondent operated at. It also more likely to affect 
the Afghan police. The Afghan Army seems more loyal than their police colleagues. 
In addition, many daily problems seem less important in the greater picture. For 
instance, the issues of ethnicity and racism may seem trivial when they, after all, lived 
and fought closely together.  
4.3 Cultural challenges 
This section investigates two aspects to do with culture. First, to what extent do living 
and operating close to people from a different culture presents a challenge for military 
advisors? Second, which challenges arise from the possible differences in 
professional identity and military culture between the forces and to what extent is the 
role of a military advisor compatible with the perceived role of being an officer?  
4.3.1 Challenges of living close to indigenous people 
As discussed in the literature review, certain authors suggests that living close to 
indigenous soldiers (Azari et al. 2010, Ramsey 2006a) and native people (Mæland 
2004) may be strenuous or cause unintended hostility towards indigenous people and 
their culture. When asked to what extent they experienced any special challenges by 
operating and living alongside Afghan forces, nearly all the respondents answered 
spontaneously none. Many said the opposite, that living close by was an advantage for 
their mission, that the Afghans were more similar to themselves than expected, and it 
was sad to leave. All expressed a sense of being well integrated and having enjoyed 
great hospitality among the Afghans. Some quotations may illustrate this impression. 
It was strange in the beginning, but on balance sad to leave. 
This [problem] is exaggerated. The ANA has worked with westerns for years. 
The least problem was cultural differences.… We were with them all the time, 
we had a closer relationship to them than to the other Norwegian forces. 
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When you live so closely together you get a unique relationship.… I find it 
strange that NATO doesn’t do it more often. Instead they cage you up in 
camps and body-search ANSF before meetings. They should be more co-
localized. Imagine the PRT co-localized with the ANA. That would have been 
something!’. 
This impression was somewhat qualified by mention of two challenges which can be 
ascribed to inter-cultural differences. First, for some the sanitary and hygienic 
conditions of the Afghan forces were uncomfortable, laborious or frustrating. The 
Afghans did not want to use the toilets, clean up garbage or maintain personal hygiene 
in the same manner as themselves. Second, several found expressions of religious 
fatalism and certain religious customs, for instance fasting at Ramadan, to be 
problematic. Religious fatalism was described by one respondent: 
When we make tactical dispositions, they put a bit too much into the hands of 
Allah.… They say they see the point of shooting practice, but at the end of the 
day it is up to Allah whether they hit the target or not. 
The frustration expressed by the respondents was not of a religious complexion, but 
directed at the Afghan’s shaky commitment. Another respondent described why this 
felt frustrating: 
They stand upright when they shoot instead of lying down because if it’s what 
Allah wants, they’ll survive. If we had taken casualties or had to expose 
ourselves or others to danger because of that, it would have been frustrating. 
Despite these examples, the majority found living, eating and operating with the 
indigenous forces unproblematic.  
 
All in all, it is interesting that so few experienced any special challenges with regard 
to living close to the Afghans. Four possible explanations are worth reflecting over: 
Bonding in harsh situations affects the overall impression: Group dynamics in combat 
are strong. The respondents also pointed to the importance of this. All the units 
represented in this analysis, and almost all respondents, were personally engaged in 
combat situations during their deployment in Afghanistan. It is plausible that the 
respondents’ general impression of success, and that everyone made it back home 
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despite many dangerous situations, may have erased memories of those challenges 
one considered less important in the bigger picture.  
The need to establish in-groups and out-groups: Some reported having to defend the 
ANA to other Norwegian units in Afghanistan. One respondent argued, “there was a 
lot of shitty talk about the ANA” in these units. Some mentoring units expressed 
dissatisfaction with the better living standards, equal pay and more isolated and safer 
living quarters of these other Norwegian units referred to above.22 Some of the 
respondents lived with the ANSF in bases isolated from other foreign units. It is 
possible to understand the need for identifying the Afghan forces and oneself as an in-
group and the other Norwegians as an out-group.  
Expectations were worse: Many expressed throughout the interview but particularly in 
connection with questions about culture, that the differences between “them” and “us” 
were smaller than expected. To a follow-up question on where these expectations 
came from, a respondent said, 
Training in cultural understanding taught us that you have to be very careful 
with religion, women, don’t mention this and at least not that, don’t sit in this 
way or that way. But when you get to know people you can talk about most 
things.… I even discussed polygamy with my counterpart.  
Finally, negative attitudes towards Afghans may be a sensitive topic and there could 
be issues in this regard which the respondents did not wish to elaborate. However, the 
general impression from the interviews does not support this assumption.  
4.3.2 Professional identity and the compatibility of the role of 
advisor 
Some elements of military culture, such as eagerness to act when confronted with lack 
of host-nation progress, may have caused challenges for military advisors. And much 
sympathy for the indigenous people and their cause may have challenged officers’ 
                                              
22
 In contingent reports classified “restricted”, available from author. 
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military identity. The respondents were therefore asked about differences between 
Afghan and Norwegian professional identity, and whether the differences eased or 
hampered cooperation, and to what extent they perceived their advisory role as 
compatible and consistent with being an officer. The findings will be presented under 
these three questions, and discussed together at the end of this section. 
Similar profession but different identity 
Nearly all respondents intuitively pointed to similarities of both Norwegian and 
Afghan military cultures. They were all soldiers in a hierarchic structure, everybody 
wanted to survive and come home, and both nations have a soldier creed and pride in 
their profession. However, half of the respondents also mentioned differences with 
regard to professionalism. Most wanted to emphasize how similar they all were as 
soldiers at an abstract level, but when it came to concrete situations several also 
pointed out differences and challenges linked to their particular professional field. 
The leaders pointed to differences in leadership philosophy and company mentors 
pointed to ANSF’s lack of preparation and training. One case illustrates both the 
intuitive similarities and how the deeper challenges came to the surface during the 
interview: 
We were surprisingly similar, I think, hierarchic structure is an example.…  I 
told him we are both commanders, equals… [but during one operation] I 
asked him ‘What do you want to do?’ Then the answer of course is ‘I will do 
whatever you tell me to do’.… Afterwards he yelled at his mentor like hell, 
and said it was scandalous that we did not go further.… He said: ‘I could not 
disagree in front of the PRT commander’.… That would never happen in 
Norway. Even the youngest officer can suggest doing this or that. We have 
better leaders at the lower level, and the Norwegian principles of equality are 
strong.  
The advisor wanted to work with his Afghan counterpart as a fellow commanding 
officer, but was met with submissiveness. For one respondent the biggest problem 
was to get the Afghans to plan for unforeseen situations: 
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The ANA Brigade made only one plan, it did not give the commander any 
leeway.… They seemed incapable of grasping abstract thinking, they were 
unable to handle planning for several possible outcomes, if they had only one 
plan, and the chief signed it they were all bound to that plan. In one case 
[when the situation changed], I had to write a letter where I personally took 
full responsibility for blowing up that [ANA item].… If I had not, he would 
have ended up in prison and been shot. 
 
Norwegian professional identity perceived as an accelerator for 
cooperation 
Nearly all respondents felt their cooperation with the Afghans enhanced by their 
Norwegian professionalism. For instance, many argued that tolerance and sensitivity 
towards other cultures are traits of Norwegian military culture. As one respondent put 
it, 
The prayer-speaker went on five to six times a day. The men did not screw 
around; they did not imitate shouting even stuff like that, which is tempting to 
do. That is the advantage with bringing grown-up people. 
Flexibility regarding rank and military position was emphasized by many respondents. 
For instance, one pointed out that Norwegians without advising tasks would help to 
advise Afghans by teaching and training them. Officers would (and should) help with 
practical soldier’s tasks like driving, digging and carpeting. Several, many 
unsolicited, contrasted this understanding of professionalism with the typical 
American officer who, in some cases, they perceived as rigid, too controlled by 
regulations, too hierarchy oriented and arrogant towards foreign cultures.  The 
literature reviewed indicates that American military culture could hamper cooperation 
with foreigners. The respondents agreed, by and large. The quotations run as follows: 
Norwegians are flexible and US Army are too loyal to TTP [tactical 
procedures], regulations and hierarchy. 
Some units come and want to achieve as much as possible through their 
months down there. The Americans were even worse; they wanted everything 
done straight away. 
They [US Forces] had a lot of dos and don’ts, they could do this but not that, 
if they did something else no one should know about it.… Norway is 
different… everyone contributes and is flexible. 
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Nevertheless, some respondents felt that their Norwegian cultural traits, like good 
intentions when acting on possibilities to improve the situation in Afghanistan, could 
be a source of frustration for a differently motivated Afghan leadership. As one noted,  
We were more idealistic.… The ANA collect their wages so that their families 
shall survive. Only a few of them are idealists and unfortunately they often get 
trampled on by someone at the level above [them]. 
The advisory role is experienced compatible with being an officer 
Nearly all reported found the advisory role compatible with being an officer because 
the mission felt meaningful, it was easy to see progress and one was allowed to 
practise and master “the officer profession”, i.e. practise leadership in combat, pass on 
knowledge through training, supervision and education (most Norwegian officers are 
used to training soldiers and officers in Norway), and mastering demanding situations. 
Interestingly, only one respondent mentioned “making Norway safer” as a unifying 
aspect of these roles. For the majority, compatibility meant meaningful operations in 
accordance with what they saw as duties of a professional military leader. As one 
chief of the mentoring units commented: 
You get to test yourself as a leader in rough situations. You have often 
thought about it.… The feeling of doing something everyone at home thinks 
well of, and simultaneously seeing results down there: It cannot be any better 
than that. 
 
Comments and reflections to professional identity 
Though the role of military advisor is complex, it does not in itself seem to have 
caused any severe challenges. Their role perceptions of being a teacher, soldier and 
officer – sometimes simultaneously – all seem very much in line with expectations 
and identity. Differences between Afghan and Norwegian military cultures are clearly 
pointed out, but not as insurmountable problems. The explanation is twofold. First, 
the feeling of success and meaningful input is vital, especially among those who see 
progress in the ANSF as the overriding objective. Second, the opportunity to test and 
master military responsibilities, in accordance with the role of officer and professional 
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combatant, is also emphasized. The latter depends on the situation during the 
operation, and as mentioned, combat situations and high threat levels have probably 
contributed to a more coherent understanding of one’s role. In Mæland’s study, the 
different role perceptions of the respondents caused some moral inconsistency among 
the Norwegian officers (2004:43). His study also showed that negative attitudes 
towards the indigenous people can develop among foreign forces. The findings of this 
analysis show no support for such attitudes or conflicting roles. However, negative 
attitudes are a sensitive issue, and one cannot exclude the possibility that the 
respondents “trimmed” their answers because they were difficult to talk about. But 
this hypothesis finds no support in the rest of the material.   
It is more plausible that the lack of challenges and negative attitudes was because the 
mission was largely considered meaningful, and because Norwegian and indigenous 
forces actually operate together as soldiers. That is a recognizable activity and role 
for Norwegian officers. It creates an impression of progress compared to missions 
where military forces are there to help the civilian population, as in the peace-building 
operations in the Balkan on which Mæland’s findings are based (2004). In 
Afghanistan, Norwegians may not experience the same proximity to suffering 
civilians, and therefore be spared for de-humanizing mechanisms that may be at play 
in war-torn societies.  
4.3.3 Combat situations and positive aspects 
Two questions were asked at the end of the interviews. First, the extent to which they 
experienced combat situations as a vital challenge in their job. Second, what they saw 
as the consistently most positive aspect of their mission in Afghanistan, and the most 
positive aspect of their work with the Afghan forces. The first questions were 
intended to identify respondents who saw combat and threat situations as the 
overriding challenges in the mission, but too obvious to mention. The latter was 
formulated to give the respondents a chance to reflect on the positive aspects of their 
work with Afghans, since the analysis and questions largely focus on problems.  
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Although the respondents had all experienced combat and high threat situations in 
some form or another, very few emphasized this in the interviews. They rather spoke 
of the threat, combat situations and fire-fights in a very level-headed way. They were 
described in neither positive nor negative terms, but as something they felt trained and 
prepared for but of secondary importance to the main mission of improving the 
Afghan forces. However, three respondents pointed to expectations and eagerness of 
younger personnel as challenging. Especially in combat situations or situations where 
younger, subordinate personnel found the behaviour of the Afghan Forces unethical.  
As one company mentor commented: 
[Combat], that’s always a challenge… as a told my subordinates. ‘I hope we 
can get back and say we were never in combat.’ I have been shot at before, it 
was not nice. Young soldiers and [non-commissioned] officers do not have 
that understanding.… the biggest challenge was to moderate the younger’s 
expectations. 
As many respondents had already mentioned the importance of practising leadership 
in volatile situations as part of their role as officers, none emphasized being in combat 
as a motivational or particularly positive factor in itself. That is a small but important 
nuance, substantiated by what they saw as positive below.   
Regarding positive aspects, the respondents emphasized succeeding together with the 
Afghans, and getting to know them on a more personal and deeper level than they 
expected. For many, realizing “they are not so different from us” and feeling they 
understood a foreign and very different culture as one of the most positive 
experiences. As a company mentor remarked,   
To realize that we are not so different; that conclusion gave added value in life 
and discussions afterwards. There is much discussion on immigration and 
how bad and awful they [foreigners] are with their women and children and 
stuff like that because they have another culture than us. I feel I understand 
that better, maybe [I’ve] become more open… gained more acceptance for 
what is foreign… like other cultures in the world, like in Africa: maybe you 
understand more of the world after being so close someone so fundamentally 
different socially and so much poorer than we are. That is maybe the most 
valuable for the future.  
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The respondent described a spill-over effect; the unfamiliar became less alien also in 
everyday-life back home.  
All in all, there appears to be a feeling of mastery in having understood something 
foreign, finding common ground in an organization and with people one expected to 
be very different. Maybe most human beings appreciate being able to say “no, they 
are not like that, I know one of them myself” (and disprove or confirm stereotypes 
and nuance simple beliefs).  
4.4 Other findings in the data – the stories on the fringes of 
the general material 
This section intends to show that the variety of the respondents’ experiences 
depended on their position, mandate and location in Afghanistan.  
This analysis has so far presented the findings thematically, allowing for comparison 
across the interviews. However, two respondents had a radically different story to tell 
compared to each other, and their stories also diverged from the overall impression of 
the data. Their answers represent the “outliers” of the material. Since their stories are 
less visible in the previous analysis, they will be briefly presented in this section. But 
first some important remarks must be made. First, these stories do not in any way 
represent right or wrong perceptions, or correct or incorrect stories. They are 
experiences made with different units in Afghanistan and are equally true for the 
situation in Afghanistan. The intent is to show the stark contrast between them and 
how they contrast with the general material. Second, quotations will be kept to a 
minimum partly to preserve the anonymity of the respondents and partly due to 
structural limitations of this analysis.  
4.4.1 The story of success 
The general picture provided by this interviewee was of the overall success of 
operation, both because the Afghan forces became more independent and because 
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they had improved the local security situation. The respondent did not want to 
problematize these challenges, features of the Afghan forces, or his own decisions. 
The frequent combat situations and high IED threat levels were described as the main 
challenges, but also as the factor that tied the Afghan and the foreign forces together.  
Few if any dilemmas were confirmed or denied. Ones which were mentioned were 
described as ethical choices – so important that it was easy to choose. Problems were 
manageable, the operations meaningful and the Afghans described as easily 
persuadable to do the ‘right thing’. Unethical and illegal behaviour among the 
Afghans rarely or never took place, the cases described show rather the opposite, and 
how honourable they were. Military workmanship was described as fundamentally 
important, and trust and respect were built by being competent, brave, and always 
operating together with the Afghans (this does not diverge from the general picture, 
but it contrasts with the statements in the next paragraph). Problems regarding aspects 
of the Afghan forces, for instance corruption and ethnicity, were almost brushed 
aside.  
Few or no cultural challenges were described, partly because the Norwegian unit was 
said to consist of grown up and mature people, partly because the respondent wanted 
to focus on similarities and what bound the Afghan and Norwegian units together. 
When it came to professional identity, the Norwegian unit was described as so robust, 
so mature and so educated that it easily handled those challenges.  
4.4.2 The story of frustration 
In contrast, the story of the next respondent is one of frustration with many actors, 
Norwegian as well as Afghan. He was mainly frustrated by the actors’ way of 
handling the conflict and taking high risks to execute a strategy no one believed in. 
While other respondents were eager to talk about Afghan soldiers in general, this 
interviewee frequently returned to the factors mentioned above. The biggest 
challenges were “to get one’s own organization, with all the actors, to deal with it [the 
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ethnic sides of the conflict]”, and “risk one’s own and others’ lives for something you 
know is wrong”.  
Nearly all dilemmas were recognized, and the respondent experienced the most 
pressing dilemma when he had to take serious temporary risks for something which 
was counterproductive in the longer term. The respondent felt forced to take part in 
the conflict and support authorities without legitimacy in the population. That the way 
of operating was largely counterproductive, but just as much because of Norwegian 
guidelines as the Afghan leadership. The Afghan counterparts were sometimes 
unethical and corrupt because government behaviour towards the civilian population 
was unethical. In sharp contrast, the insurgents’ cause (not methods) against the 
Afghan authorities’ corruption and bad governance is regarded with sympathy. As the 
respondent noted,  
I really liked that Pashtun culture; honour, it is very gentlemanly. … They 
[other ISAF forces] were ambushed in our area.… I telephone him [the 
insurgent and asked] who is responsible for the attack and ‘why are you 
shooting at us?’ And he says: ‘Oh, I’m sorry, I did not know it was you’.… It 
kind of shows that there is hope. 
Cultural knowledge and the ability to understand the local context, the conflict and 
how the insurgency spread out were considered vital attributes. In contrast to the other 
respondents, this respondent believed that trust was mainly gained without operating 
together with the Afghans; the Afghan officials would be under less pressure and not 
afraid of sanctions.  
Interestingly, problems with the Norwegian culture and professional identity were 
mentioned rather than the Afghan. The following factors were given by the 
respondent as obstacles for positive progress in the conflict:23 Norwegian officers 
tend to communicate to positively upwards on the development on the ground. The 
respondent felt the Norwegian forces took too much part in the conflict, which he said 
                                              
23
 The question posed was about cultural obstacles to cooperation between Afghan and Norwegian forces, and not obstacles 
to progress in the conflict in Afghanistan. But as mentioned, the respondent often retraced into this topic. However, the 
answers were of interest since they contrasted the general material.  
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was “very ethically challenging”. Further, military educated officers are trained in 
decision making processes for quickly analysing the situation, making a plan and 
subsequently acting on it. According to him, it makes them too impatient, too loyal to 
regulations and too eager to quickly solve the conflict. In contrast with the rest of the 
respondents, he did not see his role as compatible with that of an officer; he had too 
much sympathy with the insurgents’ cause, and the Norwegian effort was too partial 
in the conflict.  
4.4.3 Comments and reflections 
How can two stories that are so different be explained? The two respondents were 
from different units, with different tasks, operating with different counterparts. Since 
they operated in different areas, their answers could reflect good or bad progress in 
those areas; one should not underestimate the local dynamics in a conflict. Also, the 
respondents could, maybe unconsciously, have had an agenda or “story to tell” 
another officer colleague. But then it should have been more apparent in other 
interviews as well. In addition, the frustration described by the last respondent did not 
take the form of a coherently directed message, as an agenda would, but was directed 
at many actors. The most plausible explanation seems to be the simplest; their 
experiences were radically different due to the local context, differences in the 
mission they performed and the fact that experiences are formed by personalities and 
that people express themselves differently. Still, it provides an interesting insight; the 
experiences of Norwegian officers are far from coherent. It underlines the importance 
of not considering all Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan as a homogeneous group.  
A series of challenges regarding military advising has been analysed in this chapter. 
Some were confirmed, some nuanced, and many experienced as manageable. The 
following chapter looks beyond the operation in Afghanistan at consequences for 
other operations Norwegian officers participate in. 
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5. Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the challenges Norwegian officers face when cooperating 
closely with the Afghan forces in order to transfer the responsibility of security to 
Afghan authorities. The concluding chapter has three parts. First, the research 
question will be answered by pointing at the most important findings regarding ethical 
and practical challenges, and how this relates to the literature. Second, the 
conclusions regarding the cultural challenges will be compared with other research 
conducted on a similar group but with a very different outcome, in order to indicate 
some implications of employing armed forces to very different operations. Finally, 
some implications for Norwegian foreign policy will be highlighted. 
However, it should be noted that the source of data naturally does not allow for 
generalizations and limits the scope of the claims that can be made. For instance, the 
findings at the fringes of the general material have shown that even though the 
interviewees have many similarities, two respondents had radically different 
conceptions of the challenges in Afghanistan. In addition, the findings represent the 
normative perceptions among Norwegian officers, and not those of the Afghans. For 
further research, an approach taking Afghan officers or civilians into consideration 
could say more about the effect and consequences of military advising. 
The dilemmas of state-building and the protection of civilians 
Most importantly, the challenges in the literature on state-building in war-torn 
societies were mostly perceived as manageable by the Norwegian officers. Some of 
the respondents experienced some of the dilemmas, but their experiences were not 
unambiguous and had many nuances. For instance, by focusing on training and 
improving the ANSF, one partly if not completely avoids contradictions between 
short and long-term goals. And the dilemma of dependency among Afghan forces to 
western capacities was commonly experienced, but there was disagreement about 
whether dependency obtained and if so, how. Nevertheless, the dilemma of local 
forces treating civilians unethically seems to cause the biggest challenges in these 
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operations. Unethical behaviour is manageable to a certain extent; but not when 
civilians get hurt. That seems to be the fundamental conception of the Norwegian 
officers; that one can (and must) accept ethical differences between oneself and the 
indigenous people to a certain point, but not when innocent civilians are at risk of 
getting killed. 
The challenges of military advising are also clearly perceived to be less problematic 
than the literature gives the impression of. This is true whether the challenges of 
advising indigenous forces are cultural or practical.  
Since so few challenges are emphasized, it seems appropriate to discuss why they are 
perceived manageable. All in all, the respondents felt they could handle most 
challenges, and the mission still seemed meaningful. As one respondent noted, there 
were often choices to be made between leading and advising: 
I had to take lead… up to the hill and point and explain and say ‘you shoot in 
that way and you shoot this way’.… These choices were every-day life, it was 
challenging.… You get into these situations all the time where you have to 
choose, and then you just hope you made the right decision.  
A contributing factor to why so few challenges are highlighted might be that officers 
tend to focus on solutions. They are not as problem-oriented as the literature on post-
war state-building is, naturally, since this research seeks to ask questions and nuance 
the picture. For officers in a small and remote base with Afghan forces under high 
levels of threat, a solution-oriented focus becomes a necessity; without it, the 
challenges in Afghanistan could seem overwhelming.  
These conclusions complement those of the state-building literature in two respects. 
First, since the literature has focused on the independent role of the outside forces, not 
in collaboration with local forces, it underestimates the ethical challenges of having to 
support and legitimate the actions of indigenous forces, especially when it comes to 
protecting civilians. Second, there is a gap between the literature and the field of 
practice investigated here, since the ethical dilemmas from literature are mostly 
perceived as manageable by the Norwegian officers. Even though previous research 
has shown that state-building poses difficult choices for practitioners, this study does 
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not find sufficient support to claim that such dilemmas are decisive for the challenges 
Norwegian officers experience in Afghanistan. 
A similar group but a different outcome 
Compared to previous Norwegian research on a similar group on a similar mission in 
Kosovo, the striking thing is that being so close to people of a foreign culture is so 
less problematic here, compared to Mæland’s (2004) and Røkenes’ (2005) studies. 
There, officers developed negative attitudes towards indigenous people. In this aspect, 
the findings of study contrasts with the literature since no such attitudes were found; 
some felt greater acceptance and tolerance for what is foreign. There might be too 
many factors not accounted for in this analysis to compare operations in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. But the difference in context of the conflicts is important, and the 
perception of being an actor in a recognizable role has proven decisive. The 
Norwegian literature mentioned above complements this assertion, since these factors 
were more pressing on soldiers in Afghanistan than on soldiers in for instance Kosovo 
or other peace-building missions. There, proximity to suffering civilians and 
difficulties in helping them are likely to foster a totally different perception of those 
one is there to help and their culture.  
 
So, what is decisive for the officers’ perception and experience of such operations? 
Apparently, it is neither the ethical dilemmas, nor the practical problems, but rather 
the very task they are set to perform. The mission is largely perceived as meaningful 
for two reasons. First, the officers feel their contribution actually makes a difference – 
the Afghan forces improve and they experience progress. Second, their task is 
recognizable; in an environment of high threats and frequent combat situations they 
feel they are performing a military assignment in accordance with their identity as 
officers. That conclusion may call attention to another, more universal debate, that 
soldiers, at least for their own sake, might handle frustrations in these operations 
better than in low-intensity, humanitarian peace-building missions. That is not to say 
that soldiers should not take part in such operations. But they seem somewhat more 
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mentally prepared for the dilemmas that arise in operations such as those in 
Afghanistan. In this aspect, officers may be reluctant to participate in missions which 
are not in accordance with what they see as their primary role. When policymakers are 
to decide upon how the armed forces can be used abroad, they might have to 
considerate how the forces themselves argue they contribute the most. Politicians are, 
naturally, in control of the deployment of armed forces. But factors such as soldiers’ 
mental health and their perception of the task may affect such decisions. 
All in all, this study has sought to contribute to bridge a knowledge gap in the 
literature on state-building in war-torn societies, and point to implications of 
Norwegian foreign policy. As the study indicates, Norwegian officers, despite the 
high risks of the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, seem to prefer such missions to 
peace operations in conflicts with lower intensity and less recognizable roles. If a 
meaningful mission with meaningful tasks is a requirement for Norwegian officers, it 
might have consequences for decision makers deciding how the armed forces can be 
of use in implementing Norwegian foreign policy. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview guide (Norwegian) 
1. Introduksjonsspørsmål 
Hvordan var/kan du beskrive ditt samarbeid med afghanske myndighetspersoner? 
Hva opplevde du som mest utfordrende i Afghanistan? 
2. Etiske dilemma  
Opplevde du noen etiske dilemma i samarbeidet med afghanske sikkerhetsstyrker? 
Motsetninger mellom behov/innsats på kort sikt og målsetninger på lang sikt 
Opplevde du at innsatsen du bidro til på kort sikt, av og til eller ofte, kunne være kontraproduktiv i 
forhold til operasjonens langsiktige målsetninger? Har du noen eksempler? 
3. Dilemma med tanke på avhengighet til internasjonal støtte  
Opplevde du å måtte velge mellom på den ene siden støtte ANSF, men gjennom metoder og 
kapasiteter som gjorde ANSF mindre i stand til selv å overta sikkerhetsansvaret/operere på lengre 
sikt?  
4. Dilemma med tanke på ulovlig eller uetisk oppførsel av styrkene man støtter  
Har du opplevd at du enten måtte støtte eller la være å gripe inn overfor handlinger utført av 
afghanske offiserer, som var i strid med enten egne moralske prinsipper eller formålet med 
operasjonen?  
5. I samsvar med vestlige intensjoner eller ’the Afghan way’? 
Opplevde du å måtte velge mellom, på den ene siden å støtte de afghanske styrkenes måte å operere 
på / operasjoner de initierte, og på den andre siden støtte den (ISAFs) høyere intensjonen med 
oppdraget / måte å operere på? 
Utfordringer knyttet til faglige ekspertise og situasjonen i 
operasjonsområdet 
6. Militær fagkompetanse og evne til å etablere et samarbeidsforhold på tvers av kulturer 
Hvilken kompetanse var viktigst for deg; militær fagkompetanse eller personlige evner til å etablere 
et tillitsforhold på tvers av kulturer?  
Er det mulig å etablere et tillitsforhold uten høy militær fagkompetanse, evt. uten å operere sammen 
med ANSF? 
Språk og situasjonsforståelse  
I hvilken grad opplevde du at språkproblemer og/eller ulik situasjonsforståelse hindret samarbeidet 
mellom deg og din afghanske motpart? 
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7. Praktiske og tekniske utfordringer knyttet til situasjonen i operasjonsområdet 
I hvilken grad opplevde du at egenskaper ved de afghanske styrkene som skiftende lojalitet, lav 
stridsmoral, etniske motsetninger, korrupsjon etc., utgjorde et praktisk hinder i jobben din? 
 
Kulturelle utfordringer 
Utfordringer knyttet til å bo tett på mennesker fra andre kulturer 
Opplevde du spesielle utfordringer med å leve og operere tett med afghanere over tid? 
8. Profesjonsidentitet – hinder eller akselerator for å etablere tillit? 
Hvorvidt opplevde du forskjeller og likheter i profesjonsidentitet mellom norske og afghanske 
avdelinger?  
Synes du den norske profesjonsidentiteten/militære kulturen hindret eller bedret samarbeidet, for 
eksempel i sammenligning til den amerikanske militære kulturen? 
Er rollen som militær rådgiver forenelig med rollen som offiser? 
Hvorvidt følte du at rollen som samarbeidspartner med afghanerne var forenelig med din rolle som 
offiser?  
9. Kontrollspørsmål 
Strid og kamp 
Hvor vidt opplevde du stridshandlinger og kamp som en vesentlig utfordring ved tjenesten? 
Givende tjeneste – positive aspekter ved tjenesten 
Hva opplevde du som det mest positive ved tjenesten i Afghanistan 
Hva opplevde du som det mest positive ved å jobbe med Afghanerne? 
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Appendix 2 – Approval NSD (Norwegian) 
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Appendix 3 – Approval Norwegian Armed Forces 
(Norwegian) 
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Appendix 4 – Information to respondents 
(Norwegian) 
Forespørsel om å delta i intervju i forbindelse med masteroppgave 
Jeg er student ved Universitetet i Oslo og jobber med den avsluttende masteroppgaven. Temaet for 
oppgaven er overlatelse av ansvar og myndighet til afghanere og jeg skal undersøke hvilke 
utfordringer man møter ved å overføre sikkerhetsansvar og politisk myndighet til de lokale aktørene i 
et konfliktfylt land. Jeg er interessert i å finne ut hvilke utfordringer norske offiserer opplever ved å 
jobbe tett på afghanske sikkerhetsstyrker og myndighetspersoner.  
For å finne ut av dette, ønsker jeg å intervjue om lag ti personer på nivået kompanisjef, avdelingssjef 
og liasonoffiser med erfaring fra området. Spørsmålene vil dreie seg om hvilke utfordringer man 
opplevde i samarbeidet med afghanske aktører, eksempelvis korrupsjon, språkutfordringer, ulike 
kulturer, standarden på de afghanske styrkene etc. 
Jeg vil bruke båndopptaker og ta notater mens vi snakker sammen. Intervjuet vil ta omtrent en time, 
og vi blir sammen enige om tid og sted.  
Det er frivillig å være med og du har mulighet til å trekke deg når som helst underveis, uten å måtte 
begrunne dette nærmere. Dersom du trekker deg vil alle innsamlede data om deg bli anonymisert. 
Opplysningene vil bli behandlet konfidensielt, og ingen enkeltpersoner vil kunne gjenkjennes i den 
ferdige oppgaven. Opplysningene anonymiseres og opptakene slettes når oppgaven er ferdig, innen 
mai 2011. Som forsker er jeg underlagt taushetsplikt og at data behandles konfidensielt. Prosjektet er 
meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS.  
Hvis det er noe du lurer på, kan du ringe meg på telefon 992 46 302, sende en e-post på 
okrekvik@ifs.mil.no, eller til ’Ola Krekvik’ via FisBasis Begrenset. Du kan også kontakte min 
veileder Torunn Haaland ved Institutt for Forsvarsstudier på telefon 23 09 59 23 eller e-post 
torunn.haaland@ifs.mil.no.  
Prosjektet gjennomføres i nært samarbeid med Institutt for Forsvarsstudier/Forsvarets Høyskole. 
Utvalget er hentet fra Brigade Nord gjennom AFA, og forespørselen godkjent av Hærstaben.  
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Samtykkeerklæring:  
Jeg har mottatt informasjon om prosjektet og ønsker å stille på intervju.  
 
 
Signatur …………………………………. Telefonnummer …………………………….. 
Med vennlig hilsen 
Ola Krekvik 
Løytnant/Mastergradsstipendiat 
Institutt for Forsvarsstudier 
